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Oklahoma, which enacted a statute barring recognition of adoptions by same-sex couples, and Professor Lynn
Wardle, who argued that “nonrecognition of lesbigay adoption decrees would be proper and permissible.” The
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INTRODUCTION
Parents and their biological children routinely cross state borders
safe in the assumption that their parent-child relationship will be
recognized wherever they go.1 The central issue raised in this Article
is whether the law guarantees parents and their adopted children this
1. The state legislatures and Congress have enacted an elaborate statutory
scheme to ensure that child custody decrees receive interstate recognition. See
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (the “PKPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006)
(requiring states to enforce sister-state child custody determinations); UNIF. CHILD
CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (the “UCCJEA”), 9 U.L.A. 649 (Part IA
1997) (revising the UCCJA); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT (the “UCCJA”),
9 U.L.A. 261 (Part IA 1968) (creating a jurisdictional framework for interstate child
custody disputes).
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same security and protection, regardless of the parents’ sexual
orientation.2 Stated more technically, the Article considers whether
states are obligated to recognize adoption decrees finalized by courts
in sister states if the adoptive parents are gay.
This question is part of a broader debate about the obligation of
states to recognize changes in family status effected under the laws of
other states. Same-sex marriages and adoptions by gays and lesbians
are at the forefront of the debate today.3 But the broader debate has
raged for decades and has included questions regarding the
obligation of states to recognize interracial marriages celebrated in
other states;4 marriages between relatives that would have been
proscribed in the enforcing state;5 migratory divorces rendered
outside the couple’s state of domicile;6 and adoptions of children
borne by surrogate mothers outside the adoptive parent’s home
state.7 The debate is divisive because it pits the family against the
state. The family has a need for universal recognition of its civil status
while the state has an interest in regulating the status of its citizens
2. Interstate recognition of the parent-child relationship is even less certain for
same-sex couples that formalize their relationship (as a marriage, civil union, or
domestic partnership) but take no additional steps to secure state recognition of the
parent-child relationship between the biological child of one partner and the other
partner. See, e.g., Linda S. Anderson, Protecting Parent-Child Relationships: Determining
Parental Rights of Same-Sex Parents Consistently Despite Varying Recognition of Their
Relationship, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 1 (2006); June Carbone, The Role of Adoption in
Winning Public Recognition for Adult Partnerships, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 341, 355 (2006);
Mark Strasser, When is a Parent Not a Parent? On DOMA, Civil Unions, and Presumptions
of Parenthood, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 299, 299–300 (2001); see also Miller-Jenkins v.
Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822, 827 (Va. 2008) (recognizing a child custody order
issued by a Vermont court that provided a former same-sex partner visitation rights
in a child custody dispute); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 330 (Va.
Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the PKPA required Virginia to give full faith and credit
to a Vermont visitation order); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 951–52
(Vt. 2006) (affirming a visitation order in favor of the biological mother’s former
partner).
3. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and
Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2143–44 (2005).
4. In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that a statute barring
interracial marriage violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). The
case arose when Virginia declined to recognize a marriage celebrated in the District
of Columbia. See Koppelman, supra note 3, at 2146–63 (drawing upon the
miscegenation cases to guide the same-sex marriage recognition debate).
5. See, e.g., National Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws Regarding
Marriages Between First Cousins, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/cousins.htm
(last visited July 25, 2008) (demonstrating the diverging opinions among state
legislatures with respect to the legality of marriage between first cousins).
6. See, e.g., Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) (considering whether the
state of matrimonial domicile was required to recognize a divorce rendered in
another state to which the petitioning spouse had moved for a period of months).
7. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and the Conflict of
Laws, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 399 (1990) (considering whether individuals living in states
with restrictive regimes regarding surrogacy might evade those restrictions by
establishing connections to states with more permissive regimes)..
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through the application of its own laws regarding marriage, divorce,
adoption and surrogacy.8 The debate also pits state against state,
because the rendering state has an interest in the recognition of its
status determinations while the enforcing state retains an interest in
regulating the status of its citizens.9 And the debate pits the needs of
the federal union against the interests of individual states.10
This rancorous debate is moderated by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the federal Constitution, which demands that “Full Faith
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”11 As this Article will
demonstrate, the Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes a far more
rigorous obligation on states to recognize judgments, such as
adoption decrees and divorces, than marriages and laws.12 Since final
adoption decrees are issued by courts at the conclusion of judicial
proceedings, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires all states to
recognize these judgments, even if the adoptive parents are gay and
even if the adoption law of the enforcing state proscribes adoptions
by gays and lesbians.13
8. See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution,
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 381 (2007) (identifying a shift in Supreme Court
case law on interstate recognition of divorce decrees “from an analysis based on the
competing interests of different states to an approach that highlighted the individual
interests of the parties involved”); Koppelman, supra note 3, at 2155 (explaining that
in a recent trend, courts have moved toward recognition of family status with the
individual in mind).
9. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Interstate Federalism: The Role of Federalism in the
Same Sex Marriage Debate 4, 22 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1011007 (last visited July 21, 2008) (claiming that interstate
pluralism protects each state’s “ability to make and enforce choices on foundational
matters such as fundamental ordering of . . . family relations”).
10. See Estin, supra note 8, at 419 (explaining that the regulation of family law
falls under the authority of both the states and the federal government).
11. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See, e.g., 1 JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 3.06[6] (2007) (explaining that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not provide
states with any avenues for avoiding recognition of another state’s adoption decree);
EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 16.6, at 703 (4th ed. 2004) (“An
adoption decree entered by a court of competent jurisdiction will ordinarily be
recognized everywhere.”); Lisa S. Chen, Second-Parent Adoptions: Are They Entitled to
Full Faith and Credit?, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 171, 173, 191–94 (2005) (arguing that
an Oklahoma statute barring recognition of adoptions by gay and lesbian couples is
unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by
Lesbian and Gay Parents Must be Recognized by Sister States Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause Despite Anti-Marriage Statutes That Discriminate Against Same-Sex Couples, 31 CAP.
U. L. REV. 751, 752 (2003) (explaining that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires
each state to recognize adoption decrees issued by other states); Robert G. Spector,
The Unconstitutionality of Oklahoma’s Statute Denying Recognition to Adoptions by Same-Sex
Couples From Other States, 40 TULSA L. REV. 467, 468, 476 (2005) (concluding that the
Oklahoma statute is unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause);
Strasser, supra note 2, at 321–22 (suggesting that a proposed Mississippi statute
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But if the Full Faith and Credit Clause decisively resolves this piece
of the debate by demanding interstate recognition of final adoption
decrees, why have some states declined, in some instances, to
recognize adoptions by same-sex couples finalized in other states, and
why have some scholars defended non-recognition? This Article will
focus on four rationales offered by those who question the obligation
to give full faith and credit to adoption decrees, including the state of
Oklahoma, which enacted a statute to bar interstate recognition of
adoptions by same-sex couples,14 and Professor Lynn Wardle,15 who
has argued that “in many situations nonrecognition of lesbigay
adoption decrees would be proper and permissible.”16
refusing to recognize adoptions by same-sex couples would violate the Full Faith and
Credit Clause); Ralph U. Whitten, Choice of Law, Jurisdiction, and Judgment Issues in
Interstate Adoption Cases, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 803, 804–05 (2003) (pointing out that a
legally enforceable adoption decree in one state is not subject to challenge in
another state under the Full Faith and Credit Clause); see also UNIF. ADOPTION ACT
(“UAA”) § 1–108 & cmt., 9 U.L.A. 25 (Part IA 1994) (concluding that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause or the PKPA requires a state to give legal effect to a final adoption
decree issued in another state). But see Recent Case, 121 HARV. L. REV. 660, 663
(2007) (questioning the characterization of adoption proceedings as judgments in
Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007)).
Even if the Constitution did not compel interstate recognition of adoption
decrees, the adoptive family’s powerful interest in secure and stable family
relationships would counsel strongly in favor of interstate recognition. See infra notes
189–195 and accompanying text; see also Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in
Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2217 (2005) (suggesting,
in the marriage context, that courts should “engage[] in a good-faith attempt to
determine what interests are legitimately in play in a recognition case and how those
interests should be analyzed”). Professor Spector argues that the PKPA requires
interstate recognition of adoption decrees rendered in proceedings that comply with
the PKPA’s jurisdictional requirements. Spector, supra, at 470–74. This Article does
not address the applicability of the PKPA, although it alludes to the controversy
surrounding the applicability of the UCCJA to adoption proceedings. See infra notes
146–150 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.C. The statute, enacted by the Oklahoma legislature and
signed by its governor, was defended in the federal district court by the state’s
governor, attorney general, and commissioner of health. Finstuen v. Edmondson,
497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1295 (W.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
Only the Commissioner of Health pursued the appeal to the Tenth Circuit. See
Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1143, 1151 (referring to the “odd posture of the appeal”).
15. Professor Wardle is a prolific scholar who has written on a wide range of
family law issues. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Preference for Marital Couple Adoption—
Constitutional and Policy Reflections, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 345, 387 (2003) (concluding
that married couples deserve a preference in adoption over unmarried couples);
Lynn D. Wardle, Counting the Costs of Civil Unions: Some Potential Detrimental Effects on
Family Law, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 401, 402 (2002) (concluding that the recognition
of same-sex partnerships has a negative impact on family law); Lynn D. Wardle,
“Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in
Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 781 (2001) (concluding that “from
the perspective of the social interests and public purposes that underlie the legal
status of marriage, the claim that same-sex unions are equivalent to heterosexual
marriage fails”).
16. Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Interstate Recognition of Lesbigay Adoptions,
3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 561, 571 (2005). Some writers use the term “lesbigay” to refer to
lesbians, gays and bisexuals. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER CARRINGTON, NO PLACE LIKE
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First, both the state of Oklahoma and Professor Wardle argue that
states that deny gays and lesbians the right to adopt may decline to
recognize adoptions deemed fundamentally inconsistent with their
public policy.17 For example, Oklahoma state legislators invoked a
public policy rationale when enacting a statute that bars recognition
by Oklahoma and its courts and agencies of “an adoption by more
than one individual of the same sex from any other state or foreign
jurisdiction.”18 Similarly, Professor Wardle, who posits that states
have “considerabl[e] . . . latitude” in declining to recognize
adoptions by same-sex couples,19 has argued that the strong public
policy of states opposed to adoption by gays and lesbians “cannot be
ignored” in the recognition context.20
Second, since many adoption proceedings are uncontested, the
state of Oklahoma and Professor Wardle have questioned whether a
final adoption decree issued in the absence of an adversarial hearing
is sufficiently reliable to be entitled to recognition under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.21 In defending its statute against a
constitutional challenge, Oklahoma argued that “an adoption decree
is not the type of judgment to which the [Full Faith and Credit]
Clause applies” because “adoptions are a matter of contract between
the parties and not a judicial proceeding in the usual sense of the
word.”22 Professor Wardle, too, advances the unreliability rationale as

HOME: RELATIONSHIPS AND FAMILY LIFE AMONG LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 5 (1999) (“I use
the term lesbigay, which is coming into wider use, because it includes lesbians,
bisexuals, and gay men, all of whom participate in the families I studied.”). Professor
Wardle uses the term “lesbigay adoption” to refer “to the adoption of children by
adults who are involved in gay or lesbian sexual relationships.” Wardle, supra, at 561
n.1.
Because neither Professor Wardle nor the state of Oklahoma relied upon the
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006), to support
nonrecognition of adoptions by gays and lesbians, this Article does not consider
whether DOMA relieves states of the obligation to recognize such adoptions. For
discussions of DOMA’s influence in this context, see, e.g., Chen, supra note 13, at
199–201 (exploring a variety of situations in which DOMA might impact recognition
of sister-state adoption decrees); Cox, supra note 13, at 756–57 (concluding that
DOMA does not excuse states from their obligation to recognize sister-state adoption
decrees); Strasser, supra note 2, at 316, 321 (concluding that “rights acquired by
virtue of a second-parent adoption do not fall within the exception created by
DOMA”).
17. See, e.g., Finstuen, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1304 (identifying Oklahoma’s
arguments); see also Wardle, supra note 16, at 599, 608–09. See generally infra Part
IV.A.
18. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7502–1.4(A) (2007). See infra Part II.C.
19. Wardle, supra note 16, at 578.
20. Id. at 609.
21. Finstuen, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1305; Wardle, supra note 16, at 583–85.
22. Finstuen, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1304–05.
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a possible ground for non-recognition of sister-state adoption
decrees.23
Third, at least one court has refused to recognize a sister-state
adoption decree on the theory that the rendering court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to enter it.24 Because the adoption statute
in the rendering state did not explicitly permit second-parent
adoptions25 without the relinquishment of parental rights and
because the record failed to establish that the requisite consents had
been appended to the adoption petition, the trial court in the
enforcing state held that the adoption court had lacked subject
matter jurisdiction and that its decree was not entitled to full faith
and credit.26
Fourth, even if the Constitution requires a state (“F2” or the
second forum) to recognize an adoption decree finalized in another
state (“F1” or the first forum), Oklahoma and Professor Wardle have
argued that the Constitution does not require F2 to apply F1’s laws to
determine the incidents of adoption or the time, manner and
mechanism for enforcing a sister-state adoption decree.27 Put
differently, while the law of the rendering state determines the status
of the adopted child vis-à-vis her biological and adoptive parents,
other states may apply their own enforcement mechanisms and their
own laws to determine the incidents or consequences of that status.28
Oklahoma and Professor Wardle have suggested that this
“enforcement and incidents of adoption” rationale justifies nonrecognition of sister-state adoptions by gays and lesbians.29
None of these rationales justifies non-recognition of sister-state
adoption decrees. The public policy rationale for non-recognition is
flatly inconsistent with both Supreme Court precedent and an
overriding policy favoring permanency in parent-child relationships.30
The Supreme Court has repeatedly and forcefully held that states
must recognize sister-state judgments even if they find them offensive
23. Wardle, supra note 16, at 583–85.
24. See Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56, 58–59 (Neb. 2002) (describing the
trial court’s rationale); infra Part II.A.
25. Like a step-parent adoption, a second-parent (or co-parent) adoption permits
the partner of a child’s biological or adoptive parent to adopt the child without first
terminating the parental rights of the custodial biological or adoptive parent. See 1
HOLLINGER, supra note 13, § 3.02[1][a] (describing the mechanics of step-parent
adoption, where the biological parent’s new spouse adopts the child); id. § 3.06[6]
(discussing second-parent adoption and explaining that it enables an individual to
adopt his or her same-sex partner’s child).
26. Russell, 647 N.W.2d at 58–59.
27. See Finstuen, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1306; Wardle, supra note 16, at 597–99.
28. See generally infra Part IV.D.
29. Finstuen, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1304, 1306; Wardle, supra note 16, at 597–99.
30. See infra Part IV.A.3.
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on public policy grounds.31 Even if the Supreme Court had
interpreted the Full Faith and Credit Clause to permit a general
public policy exception for judgments, however, such an exception
would be deeply problematic in this context.32 A child’s need for
security and stability in her family relationships, which counsels in
favor of adoption over temporary foster care in so many cases,33
strongly countervails in favor of interstate recognition of adoption
decrees.
The unreliability rationale for non-recognition of sister-state
adoption decrees is equally unavailing. Adoption decrees are the
product of formal judicial proceedings, in which courts render
judgments informed by input from licensed professionals and
interested third parties; adoption decrees are not in the nature of
consent decrees.34
Even if findings untested by adversarial
proceedings are denied issue preclusive effect,35 final adoption
decrees have a transformational effect—they alter the personal status
of the parties and create a legal parent-child bond between the
adoptee and her adopted parent(s)—whether contested or not.36 If
divorce decrees in uncontested cases37 and consent decrees in other
types of civil litigation38 are entitled to interstate recognition under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, then, a fortiori, adoption decrees are
entitled to such recognition since adoption decrees are rendered
only upon a judicial finding that the adoption is in the best interests
of the child.39
The jurisdictional rationale is flawed because a court’s failure to
properly interpret and apply its adoption statute does not deprive it
And if a court with proper
of subject matter jurisdiction.40
jurisdiction errs in the interpretation or application of its adoption
law, the error must be corrected on appeal.41 If the error is not
corrected through the appellate process in F1, the judgment is
31. See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (rejecting a
public policy exception); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237–38 (1908) (same).
32. See infra Part IV.A.4.
33. See infra note 191.
34. See infra Part IV.B.2.a; see also, e.g., In re Adoption of L.R.B., 664 N.E.2d 347,
348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (stating that “[a]n adoption decree is not in the nature of a
consent decree”) (quoting Nees v. Doan, 540 N.E.2d 1046, 1048 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)).
35. See infra Part IV.B.3.a.
36. Id.
37. See infra text accompanying note 279.
38. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 374 (1996);
Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir. 1981).
39. See infra Part IV.B.2.a (concluding that adoptions are judicial proceedings);
infra note 236 (discussing the best interest of the child standard).
40. See infra Part IV.C.1.
41. Id.
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entitled to full faith and credit in F2 even if erroneous.42 Moreover,
even if the rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the
parties to the F1 proceeding would be precluded from collaterally
challenging the court’s judgment for lack of jurisdiction in F2.43
Both Supreme Court precedent and policy undercut the
jurisdictional rationale.44
Finally, while the “enforcement and incidents of adoption”
rationale justifies a state’s application of its own law regarding the
incidents of adoption, it does not permit a state to decline to
recognize the alteration in status effected by a sister-state adoption
decree.45 So, for example, if F2 does not issue amended birth
certificates to adoptive parents upon entry of a final adoption decree,
it need not issue an amended birth certificate to a same-sex couple
that adopts in F1 a child born in F2, even if F1 issues amended birth
certificates.46 But if F2 does issue amended birth certificates, it may
not deny one to the F1 adoptive parents on public policy grounds.47
Part I of this Article examines state adoption laws, identifying those
that permit and those that deny gay individuals and same-sex couples
the opportunity to adopt. If Part I paints the background against
which the interstate recognition debate rages, Part II presents the
foreground. It describes two concrete contexts in which states have
declined to recognize sister-state adoption decrees. First, Part II.A
presents a child custody dispute between same-sex partners in which
the trial court declined to recognize the validity of a second-parent
adoption. Second, Part II.B demonstrates that several state agencies
have balked when same-sex adoptive parents have requested
amended birth certificates from the state in which their child was
born. As Part II.C demonstrates, the state of Oklahoma went even
further, enacting a statute that forbade recognition of “an adoption
by more than one individual of the same sex from any other state or
foreign jurisdiction.”48 Part II.C uncovers the impetus for the statute
and the legislators’ own statements regarding their intent.
Part III analyzes the command of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the U.S. Constitution and the Supreme Court precedent that gives
meaning to the Clause. It then applies this constitutional command
in the adoption context, concluding that the Full Faith and Credit
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
See infra Part IV.C.3.
See infra Part IV.C.3–4.
See infra Part IV.D.
Id.
Id.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7502–1.4(A) (2007).
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Clause requires states to recognize sister-state adoption decrees. Part
IV, the heart of the paper, presents and critiques the four rationales
that have been offered in support of non-recognition of sister-state
adoption decrees. Part IV demonstrates that none of the rationales
permits states to disregard adoptions finalized in sister states,
regardless of the sexual orientation of the adoptive parents.
I.

STATE LAWS ADDRESSING ADOPTION BY GAYS AND LESBIANS

The opportunity to formally adopt a child did not exist at common
law.49 Although all fifty states have enacted adoption statutes since
Massachusetts enacted the first general adoption statute in 1851,50 few
statutes expressly address adoption by gays and lesbians.51 Statutes in
four states—California, Colorado, Connecticut and Vermont—
explicitly permit second-parent adoption.52
California’s statute
permits a person to adopt a child of his or her registered partner.53
Colorado’s adoption statute specifically authorizes second-parent
adoption if “the child has a sole legal parent, and the sole legal
parent wishes the child to be adopted by a specified second adult.”54
Connecticut’s statute authorizes “any parent of a minor child [to]
agree in writing with one other person who shares parental
responsibility for the child . . . that the other person shall adopt or
join in the adoption of the child . . . .”55 And Vermont’s statute
permits “the partner of a parent [to] adopt a child of the parent”
without the need to terminate the parent’s parental rights.56 In
addition, the Uniform Adoption Act (“UAA”) expressly authorizes
second-parent adoption by a “de facto” step-parent.57
Statutes in three states—Florida, Mississippi and Utah—explicitly
bar adoption by gays and lesbians or same-sex couples. Florida’s
49. 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 13, § 1.02[1].
50. Id. § 1.02[2]; Appendix 1–A.
51. See generally Vanessa A. Lavely, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
Reconciling the Inconsistencies Between Marriage and Adoption Cases, 55 UCLA L. REV. 247,
263–66 (2007) (noting that in the 1990s, some state legislatures began to permit gays
to adopt).
52. Nat’l Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Second-Parent Adoption in the U.S. (May
2007), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/
2nd_parent_adoption_5_07_color.pdf (last visited July 21, 2008) [hereinafter Task
Force Report].
53. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (West 2004). In addition, the California Supreme
Court has interpreted the state’s adoption statute to permit second-parent adoption
by same-sex couples not registered as domestic partners. See Sharon S. v. Superior
Ct., 73 P.3d 554, 554 (Cal. 2003).
54. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-203(1)(d.5) (2007).
55. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-724(a)(3) (2004).
56. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2002).
57. UAA § 4-102(b) & cmt., 9 U.L.A. 105 (Part IA 1994).
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statutory ban is the most comprehensive: “[n]o person . . . may adopt
if that person is a homosexual.”58 Florida law not only implicitly bars
second-parent adoption, but it explicitly bars gay individuals from
adopting.59 Mississippi’s statute bars adoption by same-sex couples.60
Utah’s statute is less direct but has the same effect: in one title, it
proscribes adoption “by a person who is cohabiting in a [sexual]
relationship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the
laws of this state,”61 and in another title, it prohibits marriages
“between persons of the same sex.”62
While most state legislatures have been silent on the question of
adoption by gays and lesbians and second-parent adoption, courts in
many states have been called upon to interpret opaque adoption
statutes to determine whether or not they permit such adoptions.63
Appellate courts in seven states and the District of Columbia and trial
courts in fifteen states have interpreted their statutes liberally to
permit second-parent adoption or joint applications to adopt filed by
unmarried same-sex couples.64 For example, in interpreting the
Illinois statute, which permits a “reputable person of legal age and of
either sex” to petition to adopt,65 the Appellate Court of Illinois
noted that nothing in the language of the statute barred adoption on
the basis of sexual orientation.66 “Because by its own terms the Act
must be liberally construed . . . and because nothing in the Act
specifically precludes it, the Act must be construed to give standing to
the unmarried persons in these cases, regardless of sex or sexual
orientation, to petition for adoption jointly.”67

58. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2005).
59. Id.
60. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (2004).
61. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (2002).
62. Id. § 30-1-2(5) (2007). An Arkansas regulation that barred persons from
serving as foster parents “if any adult member of that person’s household is a
homosexual” was struck down by the Arkansas Supreme Court. Dep’t of Human
Servs. & Child Welfare Agency Review Bd. v. Howard, 238 S.W.3d 1, 1 (Ark. 2006).
63. See Lavely, supra note 51, at 263–66 (discussing changes in state laws
regarding adoption by same-sex couples during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s).
64. See Task Force Report, supra note 52 (citations omitted) (providing a map
detailing the current status of second-parent adoption in each of the fifty states and
the District of Columbia); cf. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 642 S.E.2d 103, 103 (Ga. 2007)
(denying writ of certiorari in a case challenging the validity of a second-parent
adoption); Schott v. Schott, 744 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Iowa 2008) (declining to “decide
whether second parent adoptions are permissible”). In addition, the Tennessee
Attorney General has opined that “there is no prohibition in Tennessee adoption
statutes against adoption by a same sex couple.” Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 07-140
(2007), http://www.attorneygeneral.state.tn.us/op/2007/OP/OP140.pdf.
65. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/2(a) (1999).
66. In re Petition of K.M. and D.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 892 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
67. Id. at 899.
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Appellate courts in three other states—Nebraska, Ohio, and
Wisconsin—have read their statutes to bar second-parent adoption or
joint applications to adopt.68 For example, in In re Adoption of Luke,69
the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed a county court’s denial of a
joint petition filed by a same-sex couple to permit the partner of the
child’s biological mother to adopt the child without a relinquishment
of the biological mother’s parental rights.70 Stating that “it is
inappropriate for this court to ‘extend the rights of adoption beyond
the plain terms of the statutes,’”71 the Nebraska high court noted that
the statutes permitted adoption by a “single adult person” only “after
all necessary consents and relinquishments have been filed.”72 Since
the biological mother had not relinquished her parental rights, and
since “[t]he adoption statutes permit only the paradigms which are
explicit,”73 the court affirmed the denial of the adoption petition.74
Thus, in the United States today, the right of gay individuals and
same-sex couples to adopt varies by state and often depends upon
judicial interpretation of opaque adoption statutes.75
It may well be that laws denying gays and lesbians an equal
opportunity to adopt violate the federal Constitution.76 Whether the
Constitution protects the right of gays and lesbians to adopt on the
same terms as others (or the right of children to be adopted by their
gay caretakers) is beyond the scope of this Article, but two points
68. Task Force Report, supra note 52 (citations omitted).
69. 640 N.W.2d 374 (Neb. 2002).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 378 (citations omitted).
72. See id. (quoting the county court).
73. Id. at 382.
74. Id. at 383.
75. Task Force Report, supra note 52 (citations omitted).
76. See, e.g., Megan Backer, Giving Lawrence its Due: How the Eleventh Circuit
Underestimated the Due Process Implications of Lawrence v. Texas in Lofton v. Secretary of
the Department of Children & Family Services, 90 MINN. L. REV. 745, 746 (2006)
(concluding that the Florida statute “impermissibly burdens a fundamental right of
the gay plaintiffs in Lofton”); Christopher D. Jozwiak, Lofton v. Secretary of the
Department of Children & Family Services: Florida’s Gay Adoption Ban Under Irrational
Equal Protection Analysis, 23 LAW & INEQ. 407, 409 (2005) (arguing “that the Lofton
court incorrectly determined that Florida’s treatment of gays and lesbians is not a
denial of equal protection”). But see, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children &
Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Florida statute); Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that
“whatever claim a prospective adoptive parent may have to a child, we are certain
that it does not rise to the level of a fundamental liberty interest”); Martin R.
Gardner, Adoption by Homosexuals in the Wake of Lawrence v. Texas, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
19, 22 (2004) (concluding that Lawrence v. Texas “leaves policy-makers free . . . to
deny adoptions to parties involved in homosexual relationships”). A very recent
decision of a state trial court in Florida found that the Florida statute barring
adoption by gays and lesbians is unconstitutional. In re Adoption of John Doe (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008), at *65, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pdf/
flaadoption.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2008).
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nevertheless should be made. First, if the Constitution protects the
right of gays and lesbians to adopt on the same terms as others, then
the interstate recognition issue will be far less salient. Second, in the
absence of an authoritative ruling by the Supreme Court on the
substantive question, state laws governing adoption by gays and
lesbians are likely to continue to vary. Given this patchwork quilt of
state adoption laws and a highly mobile society,77 the question of
interstate recognition of adoption decrees assumes enormous
importance in the lives of adoptive families.
II. THE CURRENT INTERSTATE RECOGNITION LANDSCAPE
Adoptions have enormous legal, economic, and social
consequences for all members of the triad.78 Adoptions alter the
family status of all members of the triad and affect support
obligations, inheritance rights, tax deductions, child custody,
visitation rights, health insurance, government benefits, and a myriad
of other issues. In the vast majority of cases, states recognize sisterstate adoption decrees as a matter of course. But in two distinct
contexts, state agencies and courts have refused to recognize sisterstate adoption decrees. First, when a same-sex couple that adopted a
child in F1 later separated and sought a judicial determination
regarding child custody in F2, the F2 court declined to recognize the
F1 adoption. Second, when a child born in F2 was adopted by a
same-sex couple in F1 and the couple sought an amended birth
certificate reflecting the adoption, the F2 agency charged with
issuance of amended birth certificates (and ultimately its court)
declined to recognize the F1 adoption. As we will see, in both of
these contexts, the adoption decrees were accorded full faith and
credit only on appeal.
A. Child Custody Litigation
Same-sex couples may create a family in a number of ways. One of
the partners may have a biological child (with an opposite-sex
partner, or with the assistance of a sperm donor or surrogate) and
77. See Adam Weiss, Federalism and the Gay Family: Free Movement of Same-Sex
Couples in the United States and the European Union, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 81, 81
(2007) (evaluating “how the European experience of free movement might serve
American activists looking to expand the rights of same-sex couples under the rightto-travel doctrine”); Wolff, supra note 13, at 2237 (opining that “a state may not
structure . . . its policies regarding out-of-state marriages . . . for the purpose of
deterring undesirable couples from migrating to its borders”).
78. See generally 3 HOLLINGER, supra note 13, ch. 12–13 (discussing the
consequences of adoptions); Chen, supra note 13, at 172 n.8, 176–77 (discussing the
rights that accrue to an adoptive parent in a second-parent adoption).
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the other partner may adopt the child through a second-parent
adoption.79 Alternatively, both partners in the couple may adopt a
child simultaneously. Or one partner may adopt a child and the
other partner may later adopt the same child. If the same-sex couple
later separates and seeks a judicial determination of child custody,
one of the parents may challenge the validity of the adoption by the
other parent.
For example, in Russell v. Bridgens,80 Joan Bridgens adopted a child
in Pennsylvania in 1996. About a year later, Bridgens and her
partner, Serenna Russell, adopted the same child in Pennsylvania in
what was referred to as a co-parent adoption. The family later moved
to Germany. When the couple separated, Russell returned to the
United States with the child and filed a petition to establish child
custody and to seek child support in Nebraska. In a motion for
summary judgment, Bridgens alleged that the 1997 adoption was
invalid under Pennsylvania law.81 The Nebraska trial court granted
the motion, finding that Bridgens’s parental rights had not been
relinquished or terminated before the child was adopted by her
partner, as required by Pennsylvania law.82 In light of this failure to
comply with Pennsylvania statutory requirements, the Nebraska court
concluded that the Pennsylvania court had lacked subject matter
jurisdiction and its adoption decree was not entitled to full faith and
credit.83
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, finding no
evidence in the record that Bridgens had not, in fact, relinquished
her parental rights before the 1997 co-parent adoption.84 In the
absence of such evidence and in light of a statement in the
Pennsylvania adoption decree that “‘[a]ll requirements of the Acts of
Assembly have been fulfilled and complied with,’”85 the Nebraska
Supreme Court concluded that Bridgens had failed to meet her
burden on the motion for summary judgment.86
79. See supra note 25 (describing the nature of a second-parent adoption).
80. 647 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 2002). For other cases in which a child custody litigant
sought to collaterally attack the validity of an adoption decree, see, e.g., Kantaras v.
Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Starr v. Erez, 97 CVD 624
(Durham County, N.C. General Court of Justice 1997); Goodson v. Castellanos, 214
S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tex. App. 2007); Hobbs v. Van Stavern, No. 01-05-00632-CV, 2006
WL 3095439, at *1–2 (Tex. App. Nov. 2, 2006).
81. Russell, 647 N.W.2d at 58.
82. Id. (describing the trial court decision).
83. Id. at 58–59 (discussing the trial court decision).
84. Id. at 60.
85. Id. at 58 (quoting the Pennsylvania decree).
86. Id. at 60; see Cox, supra note 13, at 781–85 (discussing Russell and noting that
the Supreme Court clarified that Nebraska must recognize a final judgment from a
sister state under the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Whitten, supra note 13, at 821–24
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Although reversed on appeal, the Russell trial court decision
illustrates a judicial willingness to decline recognition of a sister-state
adoption decree in the context of child custody litigation.
B. Amended Birth Certificates
When a child born in one state is adopted in another state, the
adoptive parents may ask the state in which the child was born (the
“birth state”) to issue an amended birth certificate listing the
adoptive parents as the parents on the birth certificate. Many states
have statutes that authorize the issuance of amended or revised birth
certificates in these circumstances.87 In such cases, the birth state is
asked to recognize the adoption decree entered by the court of a
sister state.
In several cases, the birth state has declined to issue an amended
birth certificate upon the adoption of a child by parents of the same
sex. For example, Timothy Fisher was the biological father of two
children born in Virginia.88 After the parental rights of the biological
mother had been terminated, a court in the District of Columbia
permitted Scott Davenport to adopt the children without terminating
Fisher’s parental rights. When Fisher and Davenport requested
amended birth certificates, the Registrar of Vital Records and Health
Statistics for the Commonwealth of Virginia issued new birth
certificates listing Davenport as father, but omitting Fisher. The
Registrar declined to issue birth certificates listing both men as
parents.89 When the men sued, the Circuit Court for the City of
Richmond granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
holding that state law only permitted issuance of birth certificates
that listed a mother and a father, not two mothers or two fathers.90
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, concluding that
the state statute and administrative code contemplated issuance of
new birth certificates listing “adoptive parents” or “intended parents”
and did not preclude recognition of same-sex couples as “adoptive

(using Russell to illustrate the difference between a failure to satisfy substantive
statutory requirements and a lack of subject matter jurisdiction), 842–44 (discussing
Russell), 847–49 (same).
87. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 102635 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 382.015(1) (West 2005); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4138(1)(c) (McKinney 2007);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 192.008 (Vernon 2005).
88. Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d 366 (Va. 2005).
89. Id.
90. Davenport v. Little-Bowser, Chancery No. HS-917-4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 24,
2004), rev’d, 611 S.E.2d 366 (Va. 2005).
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parents.”91 The Supreme Court of Virginia declined to reach federal
constitutional or statutory issues.92
The agency charged with issuance of birth certificates in Mississippi
has also declined to recognize adoptions by same-sex couples (or by
the same-sex partner of a child’s biological parent).93 When adoptive
parents challenged this practice, the Chancery Court in Mississippi
interpreted the state’s law to require issuance of revised birth
certificates listing the names of both “adoptive parents,” even if of the
same sex.94 The Chancery Court further concluded that “recognition
of the Vermont adoption decree is compelled under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the federal constitution.”95
Just as state agencies in Virginia and Mississippi balked at requests
to issue amended birth certificates naming two parents of the same
sex, so, too, did an agency in Oklahoma. As Part II.C recounts, the
Oklahoma agency’s discomfort set off a chain of events that resulted
in enactment of a statute barring recognition of adoptions by samesex couples.
C. The Oklahoma Statute
In 2004, the Oklahoma legislature amended its adoption code to
provide that “this state, any of its agencies, or any court of this state
shall not recognize an adoption by more than one individual of the
same sex from any other state or foreign jurisdiction.”96 The impetus
for the amendment was the adoption of a baby, born in Oklahoma,
by two men living in Washington State, Gregory Hampel and
Edmund Swaya.97 When Hampel and Swaya asked the Oklahoma
Department of Health to provide an amended birth certificate listing
the baby’s new name, Vivian Swaya, and her adoptive parents’ names,
91. Davenport, 611 S.E.2d at 371–72.
92. Id. at 372.
93. E.g., Perdue v. Mississippi State Bd. of Health, No. G-2001-1891 S/2, at *2
(Miss. Chancery Ct., 1st Judicial Dist., Hinds Cty., Mar. 18, 2003) (on file with
author).
94. See id. at *2 (explaining that the state statute is phrased in mandatory terms,
leaving the Bureau of Vital Statistics with “no discretion to deviate from the statute’s
terms”).
95. Id. at *2–3 (citations omitted).
96. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4(A) (2007). The Mississippi legislature
considered but rejected a similar proposal in 2000. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing
Partners but Not Parents/Recognizing Parents but Not Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law
in Europe and the United States, 17 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 711, 735 (2000); see also
Cox, supra note 13, at 781. For the argument that the Oklahoma statute is immoral,
see Carlos Ball, The Immorality of Statutory Restrictions on Adoption by Lesbians and Gay
Men, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 379, 390–97 (2007).
97. See Judy Gibbs Robinson, State Reissues Birth Certificate for Gay Couple,
OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 7, 2004, at 6A (describing the Oklahoma adoption).
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they received a birth certificate listing Hampel as Vivian’s father and
leaving the mother line blank. A letter to the couple’s attorney
explained that Edmund Swaya’s name was not listed “due to the
inability to establish [his] maternity.”98 Swaya wanted his name listed
on the birth certificate so he could obtain a Social Security card for
his daughter, make medical and educational decisions on her behalf,
and take her on international flights.99 With Lambda Legal, a
national organization that works to secure civil rights for gays and
lesbians, contemplating litigation100 and a second request for an
amended birth certificate received from a gay couple in
Massachusetts that had adopted an Oklahoma child, the Oklahoma
Commissioner of Health sought guidance from the state Attorney
General.101
In a request for an official Attorney General opinion, the
Commissioner asked whether the Registrar of Vital Statistics was
required by existing provisions of the Oklahoma Code102 to prepare a
supplementary birth certificate upon the adoption of a child if the
adoptive parents did not meet Oklahoma’s eligibility requirements to
adopt.
In particular, the Commissioner inquired about the
obligation, if any, to prepare a supplementary birth certificate upon
the adoption by a same-sex couple, outside the state of Oklahoma, of
a child born in Oklahoma.
Stating that “[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United
States Constitution requires Oklahoma to recognize properly entered
sister-state judgments”103 and further stating that Oklahoma law
requires its courts to recognize adoption decrees issued by courts in
other states or countries “as though the decree, judgment, or final
order were issued by a court of this state,”104 the Oklahoma Attorney
General concluded that the Registrar was required to issue a
supplementary birth certificate “irrespective of the gender” of the
98. Oklahoma Health Department to Issue Birth Certificates to Same-Sex Couples, HEALTH
& MED. WK., Apr. 26, 2004, at 16 [hereinafter Oklahoma Health Department]; see
Robinson, supra note 97.
99. Amy Fagan, Oklahoma Abides by Out-of-State Adoptions by Gays, WASH. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2004, at A07; Oklahoma Health Department, supra note 98, at 16.
100. Fagan, supra note 99.
101. See id.; Robinson, supra note 97.
102. See Op. Att’y Gen. Okla., No. 04-8, 2004 WL 557472, ¶ 0 (Mar. 19, 2004); see
also OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7505-6.6(B) (2007) (requiring the State Registrar to
prepare a supplementary birth certificate upon receipt of an adoption decree);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-316(A) (2007) (specifying the conditions under which the
State Commissioner of Health must issue a new birth certificate for someone born in
Oklahoma).
103. Op. Att’y Gen. Okla., No. 04-8, 2004 WL 557472, ¶ 16(1) (Mar. 19, 2004)
(citation omitted).
104. Id. ¶ 12 (citing tit. 10, § 7502-1.4(A)).
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adoptive parents.105 The Attorney General issued his opinion on
Friday, March 19, 2004.
The very next business day, Republican lawmakers in the
Oklahoma legislature “vowed . . . to enact legislation banning
recognition of out-of-state adoptions of Oklahoma children by samesex couples.”106 Legislators expressed a need “to protect Oklahoma
children from adoption by homosexual couples”107 and a fear that
“Oklahoma could become the national capital for same-sex adoption
in America.”108 At least one of the legislators, Representative Thad
Balkman, appeared to recognize that for some “older, harder to
adopt children, some of whom are in state custody . . . ,”109 adoption
by an out-of-state gay couple might be their only chance for adoption.
When asked what effect a statutory amendment barring recognition
of adoptions by same-sex couples would have on such children,
Balkman answered, “They would just stay in state custody.”110
Just three weeks later, on April 12, 2004, the Oklahoma Senate
unanimously passed a bill providing, “This state shall not recognize
an adoption by more than one individual of the same sex from any
other state or foreign jurisdiction.”111 The Oklahoma House passed
the bill on April 26, 2004, by a vote of 93 to 4.112 The sponsor of the
House bill, Representative Susan Winchester, explained, “Oklahoma
law already prevents same-sex adoptions, but not for gay couples from
other states. . . . Oklahoma would have become a national target for
105. Id. ¶ 15; see also id. ¶ 14.
106. Marie Price, GOP Vows Gay Adoption Law: Lawmakers Hope to Ban Recognition of
Out-of-State Adoptions by Same-Sex Partners, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 23, 2004, at A14.
107. Id. (quoting Rep. Balkman).
108. Id. (quoting Rep. Cargill).
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Rep. Balkman). Before the legislature could take any action in
response to the Attorney General’s opinion, on April 6, 2004, the Oklahoma
Department of Health agreed to issue a new birth certificate for Vivian Swaya, listing
Gregory Hampel as her father and Edmund Swaya as her mother. The Department’s
assistant general counsel explained that the regulations in place did not permit the
birth certificate to list the men as “parent 1” and “parent 2.” Robinson, supra note
97.
111. H.R. 1821, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2004); see John Greiner, Senate
Passes Measure Concerning Adoptions: The Bill Says Birth Certificates of Some Adopted
Children Will Carry One Parent’s Name, OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 13, 2004, at 6A (quoting
Senate bill); see also Capitol Briefs: Senate Approves Anti-Gay Adoption Amendment, TULSA
WORLD, Apr. 13, 2004, at A8.
112. Marie Price, House Roundup: Bill to Ban Recognizing Gay Adoptions Sent to
Governor, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 27, 2004, at A9; News Release, Oklahoma House of
Representatives, Republican Legislators Applaud Passage of Bill to Prevent State
Recognition of Same-Sex Adoptions (Apr. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.lsb.state.ok.us/HOUSE/news6772.html; see H.R. 1821, 49th Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2004); Judy Gibbs Robinson, State Bill Reaffirms Stance on Adoptions by
Gays, OKLAHOMAN, May 1, 2004, at 7A (expanding on the policy behind the bill’s
adoption).
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same-sex couples to adopt our children, but this legislation
appropriately changes that.”113 Senator James Williamson, the state
Senator who crafted the language in the Senate bill, expressed
disapproval not only of adoption by same-sex couples but also of
same-sex marriage: “The radical homosexual agenda includes trying
to be recognized both as married couples and as a . . . family
union . . . . The whole concept of family . . . is being challenged
across the nation.”114 Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry signed the bill
into law on May 3, 2004.115
Although one opponent of the bill expected that its main effect
would be to jeopardize the ability of same-sex couples who adopt
Oklahoma children to obtain amended birth certificates listing the
names of both parents,116 Brian Chase, an attorney for Lambda Legal,
recognized that its impact was potentially much broader:
[T]he law means that if a same-sex couple adopts a child in
another state and then moves to Oklahoma, the child would be an
orphan in the eyes of state law, meaning the couple couldn’t
register the child for school, visit the child in the hospital or take
numerous other parental actions.117

Senator Williamson stated that only one of the parents would be
recognized in Oklahoma.118
Is Oklahoma free to disregard adoptions finalized by courts in
other states, or does the federal Constitution compel it to recognize
sister-state adoptions even if it finds them offensive to its public
policy? Parts III and IV address this central question.
III. THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT OBLIGATION
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the federal Constitution
requires that “Full Faith and Credit . . . be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”119
According to the Supreme Court,
The animating purpose of the full faith and credit command . . .
“was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign
113. Price, supra note 112 (quoting Rep. Winchester).
114. Amy Fagan, Same-Sex Adoption Negated in State: Oklahoma Law Reverses Ruling,
WASH. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A05 (quoting Sen. Williamson).
115. Carmel Perez Snyder, Adoption Ban Among 17 Bills Signed, OKLAHOMAN, May 4,
2004, at 3A; see also Fagan, supra note 114 (“Oklahoma’s governor signed legislation
this week ensuring homosexual couples from other states can’t force Oklahoma to
list both partners’ names on a child’s adoptive birth certificate.”).
116. Price, supra note 112 (discussing views of Rodney Johnson of Noble, co-chair
of the Oklahoma Freedom and Equality Coalition).
117. Fagan, supra note 114.
118. Id. (discussing Sen. Williamson’s views).
119. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the
laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them
integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy upon a
just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the
state of its origin.”120

Put differently, the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was
to “transform[] an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into
a nation.”121
The Full Faith and Credit Clause neither defines the terms “public
acts,” “records,” or “judicial proceedings” nor clarifies the amount of
“credit” that states must give to sister-state statutes and judgments to
satisfy the command of “full faith and credit.” The implementing
statute enacted by Congress enlarges and clarifies the full faith and
credit obligation in two important respects.122 First, the statute
requires that federal and territorial courts, like state courts, give full
faith and credit to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of
the states, territories and possessions of the United States.123 Second,
the statute specifies that public acts, records and judicial proceedings
of the states, territories and possessions “shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories
and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.”124
Interestingly, although a single sentence in the Constitution
demands that full faith and credit be given to both “public acts” and
“judicial proceedings” (as well as “records”), Supreme Court case law
120. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (quoting Milwaukee
Cty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935)); accord Johnson v. Muelberger, 340
U.S. 581, 584 (1951) (citing Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948)) (“[T]he
Framers intended [the Full Faith and Credit Clause] to help weld the independent
states into a nation by giving judgments within the jurisdiction of the rendering state
the same faith and credit in sister states as they have in the state of the original
forum.”); Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 355 (citing Milwaukee Cty., 296 U.S. at 276–77) (“The
full faith and credit clause is one of the provisions incorporated into the Constitution
by its framers for the purpose of transforming an aggregation of independent,
sovereign States into a nation.”).
121. Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 355 (footnote omitted). Professor Jeffrey Rensberger
argues that full faith and credit serves not only a policy of national unity, but a
competing policy of interstate pluralism. See Rensberger, supra note 9, at 5; id. at 13;
id. at 19–39.
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006). Congress first enacted a full faith and credit statute
in 1790. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. Scholars have engaged in a
vigorous debate on the historical meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
the original implementing statute. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal
and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
249, 288–315 (1992); Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255 (1998).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
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has established that the amount and stringency of the credit owed to
judicial proceedings is far greater than that owed to public acts.125
A. Full Faith and Credit Owed to “Public Acts”
While acknowledging that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires
states to give the “public acts” or statutes126 of sister states some credit,
the Court has interpreted the Clause to impose only a minimal check
on a state’s flexibility in choosing its own law: “The Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not compel ‘a state to substitute the statutes of
other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter
concerning which it is competent to legislate.’”127 Rather, a state is
free to choose its own substantive law as long as it “‘ha[s] a significant
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests,
such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
unfair.’”128
In adopting this flexible approach to the constitutional limits on
choice of law, the Court has recognized that in many cases, more
than one state will have a significant contact with, or connection to,
the parties or the controversy, and in such cases, it would be illogical
to interpret the Full Faith and Credit Clause as requiring the forum
state to defer to the other state’s law rather than to apply its own
law.129 But the Court has gone even further, permitting a state court
to choose forum law even when another state has a more significant
connection to the underlying controversy than the forum state.130
125. See, e.g., Baker, 522 U.S. at 232–33 (stating that “credit must be given to the
judgment of another state although the forum would not be required to entertain
the suit on which the judgment was founded”).
126. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 411 (1955) (stating that “[a] statute is
a ‘public act’ within the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause”) (citations
omitted); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 (1951) (explaining that a particular
Illinois statute is a “public act” entitled to full faith and credit). For an interesting
discussion of whether the phrase “public acts” also encompasses judge-made law, see
LUTHER L. MCDOUGAL, III ET. AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 268–70 (5th ed. 2001).
127. Baker, 522 U.S. at 232 (citation omitted).
128. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (plurality op.)); see also Larry Kramer,
Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106
YALE L.J. 1965, 1978 (1997) (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause bars states
with no interest from applying their laws).
129. See, e.g., Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493,
501 (1939) (stating that “[a] rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit
clause, without regard to the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result
that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the
courts of the other, but cannot be in its own” (quoting Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at
547)).
130. See, e.g., Allstate, 449 U.S. 302 (holding that it was constitutional for a
Minnesota court to apply Minnesota law to an insurance claim on a policy issued to a
Wisconsin citizen for an automobile accident that occurred in Wisconsin).
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Not only does the Full Faith and Credit Clause permit states to
apply their own laws as long as they have a contact or aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, but it also permits them to decline
to apply the law of other states with significant connections to the
underlying controversy if that law would violate a fundamental public
policy of the forum.131 While Dean Larry Kramer has forcefully
argued that the public policy exception violates the Full Faith and
Credit Clause,132 the Supreme Court has not accepted this argument.
As recently as 1998, the Supreme Court in Baker v. General Motors
Corp.133 reiterated that “[a] court may be guided by the forum State’s
‘public policy’ in determining the law applicable to a controversy.”134
B. Full Faith and Credit Owed to “Judicial Proceedings”
But if the Court has read the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
require only minimal credit to the “public acts” of sister states, it has
taken quite a different view regarding the credit owed to sister-state
“judicial proceedings” or judgments.135 While neither the Full Faith
and Credit Clause nor the implementing statute makes the judgment
of one state a judgment of another state,136 the statute makes clear
that a judgment conclusive upon the parties in the rendering state is
conclusive upon the parties in sister states as well.137
More
specifically, if a court in F1 rendered a judgment for the defendant
and the plaintiff later filed a second complaint, seeking to relitigate
the claim in F1, F1’s preclusion law would bar the plaintiff from
presenting the same claim a second time. The Full Faith and Credit
131. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971) (“No
action will be entertained on a foreign cause of action the enforcement of which is
contrary to the strong public policy of the forum.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934) (“No action can be maintained upon a cause of
action created in another state the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong
public policy of the forum.”).
132. Kramer, supra note 128, at 1966, 1986 (arguing that “the public policy
doctrine ought to be deemed unconstitutional . . . across the board” because
“‘offensiveness’ cannot be an appropriate reason under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause for refusing to entertain a claim based on another state’s law”) (footnote
omitted); see also Laycock, supra note 122, at 313 (viewing the public policy exception
as a “relic”).
133. 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
134. Id. at 233 (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421–24 (1979)) (emphasis
added); see also, e.g., Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 306 U.S. at 504.
135. A judgment is a final determination by a court of the parties’ rights and
obligations from which an appeal lies. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 846 (7th ed. 1999);
see FED. R. CIV. P. 54(a) (defining “judgment” as “a decree and any order from which
an appeal lies”).
136. Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945). The
Framers of the Constitution rejected such a proposal. Id. (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 447–48 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 484 (1813).
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Clause and statute extend the preclusive effect of the F1 judgment by
requiring other states to give it the same effect that F1 would give it.
Courts in other states must apply F1’s preclusion law, rather than
their own, to ensure that the F1 judgment has the same preclusive
effect in sister states that it would receive at home.138 And even
though states may decline to apply the laws of other states that they
find offensive to their public policy, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
does not permit states to decline to recognize the judgments of other
states on public policy grounds.139
But if the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires sister states to give
judgments the same credit that they would receive in the rendering
state, on what theory might a state seek to avoid recognition of a
sister-state adoption decree? Put differently, what arguments did the
state of Oklahoma make in support of its non-recognition statute?
What arguments did Professor Wardle make in support of his
contention that “in many situations nonrecognition of lesbigay
adoption decrees would be proper and permissible”?140 We turn to
the four rationales that have been proffered to justify nonrecognition of sister-state adoption decrees.
IV. RATIONALES FOR NON-RECOGNITION OF ADOPTION DECREES
AND CRITIQUE
A. The Public Policy Rationale
1.

The interest of the rendering state
Family law has traditionally been viewed as the province of the
states.141 The state in which an individual is domiciled typically views
itself as “most concerned in his personal . . . relations”142 and
therefore justified in applying its law to determine matters of
personal status.143 When a child’s personal status is at stake, as it is in
138. ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS
THEORY, DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE 213, 216 (2001); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373 (1996).
139. See infra Part IV.A.
140. Wardle, supra note 16, at 571.
141. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992); Ex Parte Burrus,
136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890); cf. Estin, supra note 8, at 383 (stating that “[f]amily law
in America today is extensively shaped by national law”).
142. Herbert F. Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits: The Conflict of Laws
Problem, 7 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 2 (1921).
143. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 285, 287 (1971)
(discussing the law governing right to divorce and law governing legitimacy
respectively); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 142 (1934)
(discussing marriages contrary to public policy).
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adoption proceedings, several states may claim an interest: the state
in which the child was born; the state(s) in which the birth parents
are domiciled; and the state(s) in which the adoptive parents are
domiciled, among others.144 In determining which of these states has
authority to conduct adoption proceedings, the goal is to choose the
state “with the closest connections to, and the most substantial
evidence about, the proposed adoptive family.”145
Scholars have persuasively argued that the Uniform Adoption Act
(“UAA”), rather than the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(“UCCJA”),146 should govern jurisdiction in adoption proceedings.147
The UAA authorizes jurisdiction in a state that has access to
“substantial evidence concerning the minor’s present or future care”
as long the child or the prospective adoptive parent has lived there
for a specified period of time.148 Perhaps because only Vermont has
adopted the UAA,149 many courts have applied the UCCJA to
adoption proceedings.150 The UCCJA authorizes jurisdiction where
the adoptee “has his home or where there are other strong contacts
with the child and his family.”151

144. See, e.g., 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 13, § 4.07[2][a], [b]; SCOLES, supra note 13,
at 700–03; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 78(a) (1971)
(establishing that a state has jurisdiction to grant an adoption if it is the state of
domicile of either the adoptive parent or adopted child).
145. 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 13, § 4.07[2][b]; accord Herma Hill Kay, Adoption in
the Conflict of Laws: The UAA, Not the UCCJA, Is the Answer, 84 CAL. L. REV. 703, 729
(1996).
146. 9 U.L.A. 261 (Part IA 1968).
147. See, e.g., 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 13, § 4.07[2][b] (explaining that “the UAA
contains provisions that would enable the states to more sensibly determine the most
appropriate forum for exercising subject matter authority over adoption
proceedings”); Kay, supra note 145, at 713–20 (same); cf. Spector, supra note 13, at
472–75 (considering whether an adoption decree is a child custody determination
under the UCCJA or the PKPA). The UCCJEA, which was intended to supersede the
UCCJA, makes clear that it “does not govern an adoption proceeding.” UCCJEA §
103, 9 U.L.A. 660 (1997).
148. UAA § 3-101(a)(1), (2), 9 U.L.A. 67 (1994). The UAA authorizes jurisdiction
in other states in specified circumstances. Id. § 3-101(a)(3)–(5); see also Appleton,
supra note 7, at 409–13 (discussing requirements for adoption jurisdiction); Charles
W. Taintor, II, Adoption in the Conflict of Laws, 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 222, 228–51 (1954)
(considering a variety of bases for an assertion of jurisdiction in adoption
proceedings).
149. 9 U.L.A. 11 (Part IA 1994 & 2007 Supp.).
150. See 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 13, § 4.07[2][a] & n.11 (listing decisions where
courts have applied the UCCJA to adoption proceedings); Kay, supra note 145, at
712–28 (discussing the misapplication of the UCCJA and the PKPA in interstate
adoption cases).
151. UCCJA prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 264 (Part IA 1968) (emphasis added); see
UCCJA § 3(a), 9 U.L.A. 307 (Part IA 1968) (specifying when a court has jurisdiction
to make child custody determinations).
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Although it is not entirely free from controversy,152 it is widely
accepted that the forum state may apply its own law in the adoption
proceedings.153 Through the application of its adoption law, the
forum state advances its public policy, which in this context often is
framed in terms of protecting and serving the best interests of the
child to be adopted.154
2.

The interest of other states
But the state in which the adoption proceedings are conducted
(the “adoption state”) may not be the only state with an interest in
the adoptive family. For example, if a child born in one state is
adopted in another state, the child’s birth state may claim an interest
in the status of the child, especially if the birth parents continue to
live there. Likewise, if a child is adopted in one state and she and her
adoptive parents later move to another state, the state to which they
move may now claim an interest in the family. These “non-adoption”
states, whose adoption laws presumably were not applied by the court
that finalized the adoption, may claim an interest in the adoptee and
her family.
Like the adoption law of the state that exercises jurisdiction and
adjudicates the adoption proceeding, the laws of these “nonadoption” states may also embody deeply held public policies. To the
extent that states define the best interests of adoptees differently or
employ different means to serve those interests, the substantive
content of the several states’ adoption laws and the public policies
they serve may vary state to state. For example, while California and
Vermont statutes permit adoptions by gay individuals or couples,155
Florida’s adoption statute does not.156 In litigation challenging the
152. 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 13, § 4.07[4], at 4–93 (noting that “the lingering
due process concerns about permanently altering the status of birth parents who live
elsewhere argue in favor of applying the laws of the forum in which a parent executes
a consent or relinquishment or attempts to oppose the adoption”); see also Kay, supra
note 145, at 730 & n.111 (noting that in situations where a choice of law problem
presents a conflict between the policies and interests of two or more states, the
temptation to use overlapping jurisdictional provisions in order to apply local law will
be substantial).
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 289 (1971); 1 HOLLINGER,
supra note 13, § 4.07[4]; SCOLES, supra note 13, at 699; 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption §§ 36,
107 (2004); Appleton, supra note 7, at 408 n.30; Peter Hay, Recognition of Same-Sex
Legal Relationships in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 259 (2006); Whitten,
supra note 13, at 805–07.
154. See, e.g., UAA § 3-703(a), 9 U.L.A. 94 (Part IA 1994) (providing that the court
shall grant a petition for adoption if the court determines that the adoption will be
in the best interest of the minor).
155. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b)
(2002).
156. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2005).
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constitutionality of its statute, Florida claimed that its law served an
“interest in furthering the best interests of adopted children by
placing them in families with married mothers and fathers. Such
homes, Florida assert[ed], provide the stability that marriage affords
and the presence of both male and female authority figures, which it
considers critical to optimal childhood development and
socialization.”157
The public policy rationale posits that non-adoption states that
retain or develop an interest in the adoptee and her family should be
free to advance their public policies and, if necessary, to deny
recognition to adoptions finalized in sister states that violate those
policies. For example, in defending the Oklahoma statute that bars
recognition of adoptions “by more than one individual of the same
sex,”158 the state proffered an interest in “halt[ing] the erosion of the
mainstream definition of the family unit.”159 State legislators who
supported the statute expressed concern that “children of same-sex
couples could have issues of gender confusion,”160 fear that
“Oklahoma could become the national capital for same-sex adoption
in America,”161 and an interest in “keep[ing] adopted kids in
traditional family homes.”162 These public policies, Oklahoma
asserted, overrode any obligation to give full faith and credit to sisterstate adoptions by same-sex couples. Professor Wardle, too, has
argued that a state’s public policy objections to a sister-state judgment
may be so basic and deeply-seated and fundamental as to outweigh
the interest in national unity that underlies the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.163
3.

Doctrinal rejection of the public policy rationale
Although persuasive at first blush (at least to some), the public
policy rationale ultimately fails to justify non-recognition of sister-

157. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th
Cir. 2004).
158. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4(A) (2007). See supra Part II.C (discussing the
Oklahoma statute).
159. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1311 (W.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d, 496
F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
160. Price, supra note 106, at A14 (describing concerns of Rep. Kevin Calvey).
161. Id. (quoting Rep. Lance Cargill).
162. Price, supra note 112, at A9 (quoting Rep. Susan Winchester). Some policy
interests that a state might articulate—for example, moral disapproval of same-sex
intimate relationships—would not qualify as “legitimate” interests even if the
Constitution permitted states to decline to recognize judgments on public policy
grounds. See Wolff, supra note 13, at 2228–33 (considering the legitimacy of state
interests in the context of interstate recognition of same-sex marriages).
163. Wardle, supra note 16, at 609–14.
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state adoption decrees.164 As a doctrinal matter, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly rejected the public policy rationale for nonrecognition of judgments. For example, in 1998 in Baker v. General
Motors Co., the Court stated that “[r]egarding judgments . . . , the full
faith and credit obligation is exacting. . . . [O]ur decisions support
no roving ‘public policy exception’ to the full faith and credit due
judgments.”165 The Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, too,
explicitly rejects the public policy rationale, stating, “A valid
judgment rendered in one State of the United States will be
recognized and enforced in a sister State even though the strong
public policy of the latter State would have precluded recovery in its
courts on the original claim.”166
The case of Fauntleroy v. Lum167 illustrates the stringency of the full
faith and credit obligation in the judgments context. The state of
Mississippi had made it a crime to deal in commodities futures and
barred enforcement of futures contracts. Notwithstanding these legal
proscriptions, the parties entered into a futures contract for the
purchase of cotton. When the defendant declined to pay, the
plaintiff sought to arbitrate the claim. No one raised the illegality of
the underlying transaction and the arbitrator entered an award in
favor of the plaintiff.
Later, the plaintiff filed suit in Missouri to enforce the award. The
Missouri court rejected the defendant’s attempt to raise the illegality
of the underlying transaction under Mississippi law. Instead, it
“directed a verdict if the jury should find that the submission and
award were made, and remained unpaid.”168 The Missouri court
thereupon entered judgment for the plaintiff. When the plaintiff
sought to enforce the Missouri judgment in Mississippi, the
Mississippi Supreme Court refused to hold
that a contract condemned by our civil and criminal laws as
immoral, and which the courts of this state are prohibited from
enforcing, is sanctified, and purged of its illegality, by a judgment
rendered in another state against a citizen of this state . . . so that in
164. Accord Cox, supra note 13, at 770 (reading Williams as supporting the
conclusion that “the adoption decrees of lesbian and gay parenting must receive the
same recognition and effect in other states as in the state that renders them”);
Whitten, supra note 13, at 805 (stating that “the effect of a valid judgment of
adoption is to eliminate the ability of other states to reject the adoption because they
disagree with it”).
165. 522 U.S. at 233 (citing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) and Fauntleroy
v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908)).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1971).
167. 210 U.S. 230 (1908). The description of the facts and the procedural posture
of the case is taken from the Court’s opinion.
168. Id. at 234.
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a suit here on such judgment the illegal character of the cause of
action may not be inquired into.169

In deciding whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause compelled
Mississippi to enforce the Missouri judgment, the United States
Supreme Court appeared to concede the possibility that the Missouri
court might have erred in treating the arbitration award as conclusive
or in declining to permit the defendant to seek to establish the
illegality of the underlying transaction under Mississippi law.170 But
even if the Missouri court had erred, the Supreme Court emphasized
that its
judgment was conclusive in Missouri on the validity of the cause of
action. . . . [I]t cannot be impeached either in or out of the State
by showing that it was based upon a mistake of law. [T]he
judgment cannot be impeached in Mississippi even if it went upon
a misapprehension of the Mississippi law.171

Notwithstanding the dissent’s concern that the Court’s ruling “so
enlarges [the Full Faith and Credit] Clause as to cause it to obliterate
all state lines, since the effect will be to endow each state with
authority to overthrow the public policy and criminal statutes of the
others,”172 the majority concluded that “no . . . painful or humiliating
consequences [would] follow upon [its] decision.”173 It expressed
confidence that courts in each rendering state would decide cases in
good faith.174
The Supreme Court has occasionally recognized “limitations upon
the extent to which a state may be required by the full faith and
credit clause to enforce even the judgment of another state in
contravention of its own statutes or policy.”175 But these few cases
(decided a century ago) involved judgments purporting to affect real
estate located in another state176 and judgments on penal claims.177
169. Lum v. Fauntleroy, 32 So. 290, 291 (Miss. 1902), rev’d, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
170. Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 237.
171. Id. (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 239 (White, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 237.
174. Id. at 237–38.
175. Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939)
(citations omitted).
176. See Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611, 615 (1915) (holding that an Alabama
court was free to apply the Alabama statute of descents, which excluded children
adopted by proceedings in other states, in a suit to quiet title to Alabama land);
Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386, 395 (1910) (stating that, in an action to partition
real estate located in New York and devised by a will probated in New York, the New
York court was free to apply its own law to determine which individuals qualified as
“lawful issue” of the named legatee); Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186, 195 (1900)
(holding that a Connecticut court could apply its own law to determine the
devolution of title to real estate located in Connecticut notwithstanding a South
Carolina judgment regarding the property because the South Carolina court lacked
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None of them supports a general public policy exception, and the
Court’s far more recent statement in Baker rejects such an
exception.178
4.

Policy arguments against the public policy rationale
It would be quite unsatisfying if doctrine alone, unsupported by
reason, militated against the public policy rationale. But good
reasons support the doctrine and the Court’s differential reading of
the amount of “credit” owed to “public acts” and “judicial
proceedings.” First, while the legislative process may be costly—state
resources are invested to perform research, hold hearings, draft
legislation and engage in debate—the cost is spread over the
hundreds of thousands or millions of citizens who may benefit from
the new legislation. Therefore, if an F2 court chooses to apply its
own law to an interstate conflict with which both F1 and F2 have
significant contacts, that decision will not likely cause F1 to question
its investment in its legislation or to feel that its resources have been
squandered. F1’s investment will still redound to the benefit of the
broader F1 community, as intended.
On the other hand, once an F1 court assumes jurisdiction over a
case, it invests resources—to issue a docket number, to accept filings,
to hear motions, to write pre-trial opinions, to empanel a jury, to
decide the case and to enter a judgment—that are dedicated to
resolving the particular dispute before it.179 While the broader F1
community ultimately may benefit from the creation of a precedent
(in the unlikely event that the case produces a published opinion),
the judgment itself binds only the litigants before the court and the
investment is made for their exclusive benefit. If an F2 court declines
jurisdiction to adjudicate title to Connecticut real property). Hood will be discussed
more fully infra Part IV.D.2.b. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11 (1909) (stating that
“the court, not having jurisdiction of the res, cannot affect it by its decree, nor by a
deed made by a master in accordance with the decree”).
177. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666–67 (1892) (limiting the scope of
Chief Justice Marshall’s statement that “[t]he courts of no country execute the penal
laws of another” to those laws that “impos[e] punishment for an offense committed
against the state, and which . . . the executive of the state has the power to pardon”);
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888), overruled in part by Milwaukee
County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935) (suit brought in a Wisconsin state
court by Milwaukee County against an Illinois corporation for unpaid state income
tax); see also Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294–95 (1942) (stating that as
far as a public policy exception for judgments is concerned, “the decisions, as
distinguished from dicta, show that the actual exceptions have been few and far
between”) (footnotes omitted).
178. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (“[O]ur decisions
support no roving ‘public policy exception’ to the full faith and credit due
judgments.”) (citations omitted).
179. See Rensberger, supra note 9, at 16–17.
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to recognize F1’s judgment on public policy grounds, F1’s investment
in the particular case will have been wasted or at least significantly
diluted.
Thus, economic considerations support the Court’s
unwillingness to recognize a public policy exception to the faith and
credit owed to judgments.180
Second, when a state legislature enacts a law, it seeks to ascertain
and codify the best possible policy to address a perceived problem.
But the legislature recognizes that reasonable minds may differ on
what constitutes the best policy and that, even if everyone agreed on
the best policy for F1, it might not be the best policy for F2, because
of different demographics, topography, natural resources, social and
political culture, or other conditions. In fact, we not only recognize
the likelihood that there may be multiple, reasonable legislative
prescriptions to many social problems, but we celebrate the states’
ability to experiment with different approaches when we talk about
our fifty state “laboratories.”181 Given this multiplicity of reasonable
policy prescriptions and given legislative tendencies to enact laws
setting forth broad and general policies rather than specific solutions
to narrow problems, when more than one state has a meaningful
connection with the parties or the underlying transaction or
occurrence, no one state can claim the exclusive right to have its law
and policy applied to resolve the interstate controversy.182 Put
differently, no state has reason to doubt the integrity of its legislative
process merely because another state has enacted a different law and
a court addressing an interstate problem has chosen to apply the
other state’s law.
When a court adjudicates a case, on the other hand, it does not (or
at least is not supposed to) resolve abstract, broad or general policy
questions, but rather it applies the chosen law to a particular,

180. See Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 293–94 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (discussing “Virginia’s efforts and expense on an applicant’s behalf”
and stating that “[t]hese efforts, and the corresponding interests in seeing that those
efforts are not wasted, lie at the very heart of the divergent constitutional treatment
of judgments and statutes”).
181. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788 (1982)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Scafide v. Bazzone,
962 So. 2d 585, 593 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (referencing “forty-nine other state
laboratories of judicial decision-making”); NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, THE FUTURE OF
FEDERALISM 8–9 (1962) (describing the federal idea as promoting “creativity,
imagination, and innovation in meeting the needs of the people”); Rensberger, supra
note 9, at 21 (“Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause . . . the vision must be of the
nation as a community of communities.”).
182. See, e.g., David P. Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Marriages, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 7,
11 (1997) (stating that “modern decisions never require one state with a legitimate
interest in applying its own law to defer to the laws of another”).
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concrete set of facts.183 While some decisions are left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge, other decisions—those on questions of
law, for example—have a “right” answer; and if the trial court gets it
wrong, the appellate court will review the decision de novo.184 Even
discretionary decisions can be reversed on appeal if they are “clearly
and prejudicially wrong.”185 With the appellate process in place to
correct judicial errors, each state takes pride in the ability of its courts
to resolve disputes fairly and in accordance with the law. Put
differently, once a court assumes jurisdiction of a case, the state has a
powerful interest in the integrity and accuracy of its judicial process
and in the respectful treatment of its judgments by courts in other
states. If another state were to decline to recognize a judgment, the
integrity of the rendering state’s judicial process might be called into
question. To avoid this potential friction and insult, our system leaves
it to the rendering state’s judicial system to correct any errors and
requires other states to recognize sister-state judgments.
Third, in the context of judgments, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause serves the same policies that preclusion doctrine generally
serves: finality, efficiency and consistency.186 As the Supreme Court
has stated more than once, “[i]t is just as important that there should
be a place to end as that there should be a place to begin
litigation.”187 If F2 were not compelled to recognize F1 judgments,
then the same claim might be relitigated repeatedly in different
states. Such relitigation would be wasteful and potentially harassing,
and it would stymie interstate commercial activity.188 Moreover, it

183. See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 293 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that “Virginia
surely has a stronger interest . . . when that employer has already been haled before a
Virginia tribunal and adjudged liable than when the employer simply claims the
benefit of a Virginia statute in a proceeding brought in another State”).
184. While appellate courts apply deferential standards of review to findings of
fact and discretionary decisions, they have “plenary and superior authority to
determine” questions of law. FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 772 (5th ed.
2001).
185. Id. at 767.
186. See, e.g., Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health
Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691, 704 (1982) (stating that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause was designed to reduce uncertainty, confusion, and delay); Thomas, 448 U.S.
at 288–89 (White, J., concurring) (emphasizing that one purpose of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause is to promote finality); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938)
(emphasizing the need for finality); see also Cox, supra note 13, at 777 (discussing the
national interest in finality of judgments).
187. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 350 (1948) (quoting Stoll, 305 U.S. at 172);
see also Chen, supra note 13, at 195–96 (discussing the need for finality); Currie, supra
note 182, at 11 (same).
188. See Rensberger, supra note 9, at 17–18 (“Without a strong Full Faith and
Credit Clause for judgments, and money judgments in particular, commercial
relations between persons located in different states would be problematic[, and] the
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could yield inconsistent results that would call into question the
integrity of the judicial system.
While these policy considerations support the stringent
interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the judgments
context, there is an additional concern in the adoption context that
counsels powerfully in favor of interstate recognition of adoption
decrees. The social science literature amply establishes every child’s
need for a stable, loving relationship with a “psychological” parent.189
As Congress recognized when it enacted the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997,190 “adoption is an effective way to assure that
children grow up in loving families and that they become happy and
productive citizens as adults. There seems to be almost universal
agreement that adoption is preferable to foster care.”191 The child
experiences this universal need for a stable relationship with a parent
not only in the state in which she is born or in the state that finalizes
the adoption, but in all states to which she and her family travel or
move.192
If the state to which the family moved were to refuse to recognize
the adoption, the adoptive parent would continue to serve as the
child’s psychological parent.193 But in the absence of a legally
commerce of the United States would economically Balkanized due to significantly
increased transaction costs in all interstate business.”).
189. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
17–20 (1973) (describing the psychological parent-child relationship); ANTHONY N.
MALUCCIO ET AL., PERMANENCY PLANNING FOR CHILDREN: CONCEPTS AND METHODS 3, 16
(1986) (emphasizing that predictability, continuity and stability in relationships
promotes a child’s growth and functioning).
190. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
191. H.R. REP. NO. 105–77, at 8 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2740;
see also, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 189, at 31, 35 (emphasizing the importance of
continuity in a child’s life and explaining that adoptions provide continuity);
Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: Standards for
Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and
Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 637, 645–46, 667–72 (1976)
(highlighting the need for a system that provides children with continuous and
stable living arrangements, emphasizing the importance of continuity, and discussing
the specific harms that result from temporary placement); cf. Mark F. Testa, The
Quality of Permanence—Lasting or Binding? Subsidized Guardianship and Kinship Foster
Care as Alternatives to Adoption, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 499, 503, 528, 534 (2005)
(questioning whether adoption more effectively achieves permanence than stable
kinship foster care).
192. See Chen, supra note 13, at 196 (arguing that the inability to relitigate a final
adoption judgment creates stability for the adoptive family); Cox, supra note 13, at
779 (“Having determined that it would be in the child’s best interest to be adopted
by the parent or parents, it would be terrible to have that relationship thrown into
jeopardy as the family moved or traveled across the country.”).
193. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 189, at 27–28 (explaining that a healthy
psychological parent-child relationship may develop even without a formal
adoption); see also Wolff, supra note 13, at 2218 (dispelling “the fantasy . . . that gay
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recognized parent-child relationship, the would-be parent might not
be able to secure employer-provided health insurance for the child;
authorize medical care and emergency treatment for her; make
educational decisions on her behalf; obtain a Social Security card for
the child; or take her on international flights.194 Thus, it likely would
be more difficult for the parent to provide for the child’s most basic
needs. Moreover, to the extent that the child was aware of the state’s
refusal to recognize the adoption, she might feel anxiety that could
threaten the security of the parent-child relationship. And the
adoptee would have no legal entitlement to financial support from
the adoptive parent, or the right to inherit from her, or even the
right to maintain a parent-child relationship with her if the same-sex
couple were to separate or if the adoptee’s other parent were to die.
In short, the child would lose the legal protections and benefits
afforded by the parent-child relationship.195
5.

The public policy rationale’s last hurrah
Proponents of the public policy rationale argue that even if there
are legitimate reasons to require states to recognize standard money
judgments regardless of public policy objections, a different rule
should apply in cases involving personal status and family relations.
The state’s “vital interest” in the family relationships of its citizens is
“vastly different from the interest it has in an ordinary commercial
transaction.”196 Individual Supreme Court justices have argued, in
people . . . will simply cease to exist if they are denied any type of . . . formal
acknowledgment”); id. at 2246.
194. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 2, at 1, 18 (discussing the effects of nonrecognition of legally-recognized parent-child relationships); Chen, supra note 13, at
176–77 (discussing how the legal status of an adoptive parent-child relationship
provides many benefits to the adopted child); Oklahoma Health Department, supra note
98, at 16 (describing Edmund Swaya’s concerns); Fagan, supra note 99 (same); see
also Ball, supra note 96, at 392 (discussing the implications of Oklahoma’s statute);
Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption and Aspiration: The Uniform Adoption Act, the DeBoerSchmidt Case, and the American Quest for the Ideal Family, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
15, 17 (1995) (describing the consequences of a state’s refusal to recognize an
adoption).
195. See, e.g., In re Adoption of C.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 737 (Pa. Super. 2000) (Todd,
J., dissenting), vacated sub nom. In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002)
(identifying as the benefits of adoption “the legal protection of the children’s
existing familial bonds, their rights to financial support from two parents instead of
just one, rights to inheritance from each parent and rights to obtain other available
dependent benefits”).
196. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 358, 359 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
see also May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(“Property, personal claims, and even . . . marriage status generally give rise to
interests different from those relevant to the discharge of a State’s continuing
responsibility to children within her borders.”); Currie, supra note 182, at 9 (noting
that “Illinois does not take the same nonchalant attitude toward evasion of its
marriage laws as it does toward Delaware incorporation”).
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separate opinions in divorce and child custody cases, that a state’s
interest in its families—in the marriages of its citizens and in its
children—“prevail[s] over the interest of national unity that
underlies the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”197 And section 103 of the
Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws provides that “[a]
judgment rendered in one State . . . need not be recognized or
enforced in a sister State if such recognition or enforcement is not
required by the national policy of full faith and credit because it
would involve an improper interference with important interests of
the sister State.”198
But neither Supreme Court precedent nor section 103 lends much
support to this final pitch for a public policy exception for
judgments. While Justice Frankfurter’s opinion that a state’s interest
in its citizens outweighs the command of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause may resonate with some, it did not receive majority support.
The Court’s opinions in Fauntleroy v. Lum and Baker v. General Motors
Corp. rejected a general public policy exception for judgments, and
its opinion in Williams v. North Carolina199 (Williams I) held that even
the state of a couple’s matrimonial domicile is required by the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to recognize a divorce decree of a sister state
that frustrates local divorce policy:
[W]hen a court of one state acting in accord with the requirements
of procedural due process alters the marital status of one domiciled
in that state by granting him a divorce from his absent spouse, we
cannot say its decree should be excepted from the [F]ull [F]aith
and [C]redit [C]lause merely because its enforcement or
recognition in another state would conflict with the policy of the
latter.200

While conceding that “under such a rule one state’s policy of strict
control over the institution of marriage could be thwarted by the

197. May, 345 U.S. at 536; see Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 358 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(asserting that a state’s power to determine the marital status of two of its citizens
should not be foreclosed by a proceeding between the parties in another state,
despite the desirability of putting an end to litigation); Yarborough v. Yarborough,
290 U.S. 202, 219 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting) (stating that “full faith and credit
does not command that the obligations attached to a status, because once
appropriately imposed by one state, shall be forever placed beyond the control of
every other state, without regard to the interest in it and the power of control which
the other may later acquire.”); cf. id. at 213 (majority opinion) (concluding that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to an “unalterable decree of alimony for a minor
child”).
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 (1971).
199. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
200. Williams I, 317 U.S. at 303 (1942); see also id. at 294, 296 (reiterating the same
principle).
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decree of a more lax state,” it ultimately concluded that “[s]uch is
part of the price of our federal system.”201
As long as the rendering state has a meaningful connection with
the parties whose personal status is in issue—a condition assured by
jurisdictional requirements202—it too will have an interest in the
parties and their status. Where both F1 and F2 have an interest in
the parties and F1 renders a judgment respecting their status, F2’s
interest does not justify a refusal to recognize F1’s judgment. If the
F1 court lacks a meaningful connection with the parties—and
therefore lacks jurisdiction—a different result may obtain, which will
be considered in below.203
While section 103 of the Second Restatement of Conflicts appears
to sanction a policy analysis in determining the credit owed to a sisterstate judgment,204 a comment to the section acknowledges that “[t]he
rule of this Section has an extremely narrow scope of application”
and will apply only on “extremely rare occasions.”205 Moreover,
section 117 of the Second Restatement of Conflicts explicitly rejects a
public policy exception for judgments,206 and a comment to section
117 makes clear that “no departure from the command of full faith
and credit is permitted by the principles stated in § 103” when the
claim underlying a valid sister-state judgment is contrary to the strong
public policy of the enforcing state.207 Since section 117 specifically
rejects a public policy exception for judgments while section 103
speaks only vaguely about the “important interests of the sister State,”
the specific language of section 117 should control over the general
language of section 103.208
Even if section 117 did not undercut section 103, however, section
103 would stand on very uncertain footing. The only case cited in the
201. Id. at 302; see Taintor, supra note 148, at 253–54 (“Once a court admits that
the state in which the adoption was worked had legislative jurisdiction to create the
status there is no reason why it should refuse to recognize the absolute efficacy of the
adoption. How can a foreign adoption be repugnant to the laws or morals of a
state?”). For more thorough discussions of Williams I, see Cox, supra note 13, at 763–
68; Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and Same-Sex
Marriage Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187, 189–201 (1998).
202. See supra notes 148–151; infra notes 250–256, 295 and accompanying text.
203. See infra discussion Part IV.C.
204. See supra text accompanying note 198.
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 cmt. a, b (1971).
206. Id. § 117 (stating that “[a] valid judgment rendered in one State . . . will be
recognized and enforced in a sister State even though the strong public policy of the
latter State would have precluded recovery in its courts on the original claim”).
207. Id. § 117 cmt. b.
208. See, e.g., Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 726 n.4 (1985) (stating that “under
normal rules of statutory construction the specific language . . . would control over
the general language”).
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comment to section 103 is Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II),209
which held that an F2 court may reexamine whether the F1 court had
jurisdiction to enter an ex parte divorce.210 Williams II does not
support the proposition that a court may decline to recognize a sisterstate judgment on policy grounds. Indeed, the late Professor Albert
Ehrenzweig flatly stated that section 103 was supported by “no
authority whatsoever . . . .”211
Dean Larry Kramer views it as
unconstitutional,212 and Professor William Reynolds concludes that
“section 103 lacks a policy basis.”213
One is left, then, with the argument that the Supreme Court
should alter its interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
permit states to decline to recognize sister-state judgments that
violate a deeply held public policy of the enforcing state (if not
generally, then at least in cases involving personal status). While one
can imagine laws so odious that sister states should not be required to
recognize judgments embodying them, such laws likely would violate
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause or other provisions
of the federal Constitution.214 Thus, there should be little need for a
public policy exception that would permit states to decline to
recognize sister-state judgments.
B. The Unreliability Rationale
Those who claim that states retain flexibility to decline to recognize
sister-state adoption decrees also invoke the unreliability rationale,
which posits that states are not required to recognize adoption
decrees issued at the conclusion of non-adversarial proceedings
because they have not been tested through adversarial processes. For
example, in defending its non-recognition statute in federal court,
209. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
210. Id. at 239; see infra notes 343–351 and accompanying text. The Reporter’s
Note refers to several additional, mostly non-majority, opinions.
211. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for Its
Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230, 1240 (1965); see WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM
L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117[a] (3d ed. 2002) (stating that
“it is quite doubtful whether § 103 provides an accurate general statement of the
law”) (footnote omitted); SCOLES, supra note 13, § 24.21, at 1292–93 (describing the
limited scope of section 103).
212. Kramer, supra note 128, at 2000 n.127.
213. William L. Reynolds, The Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit, 53 MD. L. REV. 412,
449 (1994).
214. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 128, at 1973, 1989 (noting that “the federal
Constitution . . . screens out laws inconsistent with widely shared national values”);
Reynolds, supra note 213, at 449 (concluding that “a judgment complying with
constitutional requirements satisfies our basic fairness and policy norms”). But see
Rensberger, supra note 9, at 42–43 (challenging the assumption that the Constitution
“provide[s] only a single permissible answer to all policy questions”).
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the state of Oklahoma argued that “an adoption decree is not the
type of judgment to which the [Full Faith and Credit] Clause
applies,”215 but rather is “a matter of contract between the [birth
parents and the prospective adoptive parents] and not a judicial
proceeding in the usual sense of the word.”216 Professor Wardle, too,
invokes a “well-established exception to general judgment
recognition . . . for judgments that do not result from adversarial
judicial proceedings” and quickly adds that “adoptions are not
normally adversary proceedings.”217 And Professor David Currie has
argued, in an article written about same-sex marriage, that interstate
recognition of judgments affecting family status should not be
required if the proceedings in the rendering state were nonadversarial and the interest of the family’s home state was not
protected.218
The unreliability rationale appears to rest on two premises and to
make two claims. The first underlying premise is that adoption
proceedings are non-adversarial in nature, resolved by private
agreement rather than by judicial determination.219 The second
related premise is that courts entertaining adoption petitions apply
the forum state’s adoption law without considering the policies
underlying the laws of other states that may claim a greater interest in
the adoption—such as the state in which the child was born, the birth
parents’ state of domicile, or the state in which they executed
consents to the adoption—because the adoptive parents advocate or
acquiesce in that choice and no adversary appears to advocate in
favor of another state’s law.220
Relying on these premises, the unreliability rationale makes two
claims. First, since issue preclusive effect is accorded only to issues
that were actually litigated,221 legal and factual determinations
underlying adoption decrees are not entitled to issue preclusive
effect.222 Second, because the adoption court in the forum state may
215. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1304 (W.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d,
496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007) (describing the defendants’ arguments).
216. Id. at 1305.
217. Wardle, supra note 16, at 583.
218. Currie, supra note 182, at 9–10.
219. Finstuen, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1305; see Wardle, supra note 16, at 583 (stating
that adoption proceedings are typically non-adversarial).
220. Wardle, supra note 16, at 611 (noting that “[t]he profound interests of the
second state were not considered, weighed, or balanced in the adoption proceeding
in the first state that entered the lesbigay adoption decree”); see Currie, supra note
182, at 9–10 (questioning the obligation to recognize sister-state divorce decrees
rendered without an adversarial contest on choice of law).
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
222. Wardle, supra note 16, at 584–85 (quoting Whitten, supra note 13, at 844).

38

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1

not have even considered, let alone applied, the law of the state that
cares most about the adoption triad, its judgment may not be entitled
to full faith and credit.223 More generally, the rationale contends that
because the adoption court’s findings and conclusions are untested
by the adversarial process, its judgment is not sufficiently reliable to
command interstate recognition under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.224
1.

The inter-relationship between the unreliability rationale and the public
policy rationale
Before examining the premises underlying the unreliability
rationale and testing its claims, let us first explore the interrelationship between the unreliability rationale and the public policy
rationale.
States routinely recognize and enforce sister-state
judgments even where the enforcing state claims an interest in the
parties and the controversy that would have justified the application
of the enforcing state’s substantive law to the controversy. So why do
some challenge the state’s obligation under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause in the interstate adoption context?
As the public policy rationale suggests, a state may bridle against its
obligation to respect sister-state adoption decrees (even though it
typically recognizes judgments regardless of the offensiveness of the
underlying claim) because the state cares more about the family
status of its citizens than, say, their right to contract.225 Moreover, in
interstate commercial disputes and other adversarial proceedings, a
state’s interest in its laws and the policies embodied in them is
protected to the extent that one of the litigants argues for the law’s
application. For example, imagine a Tennessee citizen who worked
in Tennessee for a Mississippi corporation with its principal place of
business in Mississippi.226 Further imagine that the worker filed suit
against the corporation in Mississippi when it fired her only weeks
after she sought workers’ compensation benefits under Tennessee
law for injuries sustained in Tennessee. If Tennessee law permits
recovery for retaliatory discharge while Mississippi law does not,
Tennessee could expect the plaintiff-worker to urge the Mississippi
223. Cf. Currie, supra note 182, at 9–10 (discussing collusive efforts by spouses to
seek a divorce under the more permissive law of a state other than their home state).
224. See Wardle, supra note 16, at 583 (claiming that the adoption process lacks
“all of the hallmarks of reliability”).
225. See, e.g., Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 358 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (maintaining that the state interest in family relations is greater than its
interest in everyday commercial transactions).
226. This illustration is loosely based on Nixon v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 156 Fed. App’x
784 (6th Cir. 2005).
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court to apply Tennessee law and to advance the substantive policy it
embodies. Even if the Mississippi court declined to apply Tennessee
law and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim under Mississippi law, Tennessee would fulfill its
constitutional obligation to recognize the Mississippi judgment,
taking comfort in the fact that the Mississippi court at least
considered the application of Tennessee law.227
In non-adversarial proceedings like uncontested adoption
proceedings, on the other hand, the unreliability rationale posits that
the petitioners acquiesce in (or affirmatively seek) the application of
forum law; no other litigant even suggests that the court should apply
another state’s law, such as the law of the state in which the adoptee
was born or the state in which the birth parents executed their
consents. Thus, the threat to important public policies embodied in
the adoption laws of non-forum states is exacerbated by the lack of
consideration the rendering court pays to the choice-of-law question
and the policies and laws of sister states.228
2.

The premises underlying the unreliability rationale
a.

Are adoptions judicial proceedings?

With this understanding of the inter-relationship between the
public policy and unreliability rationales in place, let us begin our
assessment of the unreliability rationale by first examining its
underlying premises. In defending its non-recognition statute, the
state of Oklahoma argued that adoption is “a matter of contract
between the parties and not a judicial proceeding in the usual sense
of the word.”229 It certainly is true that many adoption proceedings
are non-adversarial.230 For example, birth parents may voluntarily
relinquish to an agency all rights regarding a child, including legal
and physical custody.231 In direct private placements, birth parents

227. See Currie, supra note 182, at 9–10 (emphasizing the importance of “an
adequate opportunity to protect the state’s interest in the original proceeding—
reinforced by the possibility of review by the impartial Supreme Court”) (footnote
omitted).
228. See id. at 10 (suggesting that marriages are not entitled to the same deference
as judgments in part because they are non-adversarial).
229. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1305 (W.D. Okla. 2006).
230. Of course not all adoption proceedings are uncontested. Occasionally a
biological parent will argue that a valid consent was never executed, or she will seek
to revoke consent, or she will claim that valid notice of the adoption was not
provided. See, e.g., 2 HOLLINGER, supra note 13, §§ 8.02[1] & 8.02[2].
231. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-403, 9 U.L.A. 53 (1994); 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 13,
§ 4.11[2][c].
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consent to the adoption of their child by a particular person.232 Even
when the parental rights of the birth parents are terminated in
adversary proceedings between the government and the birth
parents—due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment, for example—
often the judicial termination order issues before the adoption
In such cases, the adoption
proceedings are commenced.233
proceedings that follow are often non-adversarial.234 In other words,
no party to the proceeding opposes the adoption and no party
questions whether or how the prospective adoptive parent’s marital
status or sexual orientation affects the child’s interests.
But even if many adoption proceedings are uncontested, other
important features distinguish them from private agreements and
serve the goals of the adversary process. To start with, there is an
important difference between a private contract and a determination
by a judge that an adoption is in a child’s best interests235 and meets
the state’s other statutory requirements. As a comment to the UAA
notes, “[a] judicial determination that a proposed adoption will be in
the best interest of the minor adoptee is an essential—and ultimately
the most important—prerequisite to the granting of the adoption.”236
As the district court in the Finstuen litigation commented when
rejecting the defendants’ argument that adoptions are not judicial
proceedings, “adoptions require the sanction of a judicial officer.
That ‘sanction’ comes in the form of a judgment . . . .”237 For proof
that judges exercise independent judgment even in uncontested
adoption proceedings, one need look no further than judicial
decisions denying unopposed petitions to adopt.238
232. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-102, §§ 2-401 & 2-402, §§ 2-404–2-408, 9 U.L.A. 30–
31, 49–62 (1994); 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 13, ch. 2 (on consent) & 2-2 (stating that
“most adoptions are consensual”).
233. 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 13, § 4.04[1]; Wardle, supra note 16, at 583.
234. See 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 13, § 4.04[5].
235. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-703(a), 9 U.L.A. 94 (1994) (stating that a judge’s
finding that the adoption will be in the best interest of the minor is a prerequisite to
adoption).
236. Id. § 3-703 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 95 (1994); see Carbone, supra note 2, at 394 (noting
that the “presence of the state involves an independent party charged with the
responsibility of conducting an investigation to protect the child”) (footnote
omitted).
237. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1305 (W.D. Okla. 2006); see
Am. Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. Paste-Ups Unlimited, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 219, 225–26
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (defining the term judgment).
238. See, e.g., In re Adoption of C.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 727 (Pa. Super. 2000),
vacated, 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002) (affirming the denial of an uncontested adoption
petition and concluding that the state adoption statute did “not permit a non-spouse
to adopt a child where the natural parents have not relinquished their respective
parental rights”); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 680–81 (Wis. 1994)
(affirming the denial of an adoption petition that was uncontested in the trial court).
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Moreover, while one certainly may question the quality of judicial
decisions made upon one-sided presentations of the facts,239 judges in
adoption proceedings often are aided by impartial experts who
evaluate the prospective adoptive parents and their home to
determine the suitability of a placement.240 In agency placements, for
example, the adoption agency to which the birth parents relinquish
their child will evaluate the needs of the child and screen prospective
adoptive parents.241 Even in direct placements, where the birth
parents select the prospective adoptive parents independently, an
increasing number of states require that an officer of the court, an
agency, or a licensed professional conducts a pre-placement home
study to determine the suitability of the prospective adoptive parents
and that a court or an agency finds the prospective adoptive parents
to be “qualified” or “acceptable” even before the birth parents
transfer physical custody of the child to a non-relative.242 Likewise,
the UAA requires an evaluation by a qualified individual of the
prospective adoptive parent’s suitability before a child may be placed
in the home.243 Some state statutes also require the court to appoint
a guardian ad litem to represent the prospective adoptee.244 And
federal law requires states to perform “criminal records checks,
including fingerprint-based checks of national crime information
databases . . . before the . . . adoptive parent may be finally approved

239. See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and
Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1445 (2006) (discussing the judge’s
“remarkable informational deficit” when parties present a class action settlement for
judicial approval); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461,
479–83 (2000) (noting informational deficiencies that arise in the absence of an
adversarial proceeding).
240. Professor Wardle questions the impartiality of these experts, referring to
them as “hand-picked [and] sympathetic” or “hand-selected” by the parties. Wardle,
supra note 16, at 583, 585 n.118. He also questions whether they offer any genuine
help to the court, suggesting that they “(usually) only provide the court with the
formulaic information (to ‘fill in the blanks,’ as it were) required by statute for the
approval of the adoption.” Id. at 585 n.118.
241. See, e.g., L. Jean Emery, Agency Versus Independent Adoption: The Case for Agency
Adoption, 3 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 139, 142 (1993) (discussing how agencies
benefit both the adoptive child and the prospective parents); see also 1 HOLLINGER,
supra note 13, §§ 3.03[3], 4.12 (detailing services usually offered by licensed
agencies); 2 HOLLINGER, supra note 13, § 7.02[2][b] (explaining that agencies
ordinarily conduct a study of prospective adoptive parents and their home before
approving any adoption).
242. 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 13, § 1.05[3][b], at 1–71 & n.43 (citations omitted).
Home studies are not always required in step-parent and second-parent adoptions.
See id. § 4.12 (noting the court’s discretionary power to order such a study); Carbone,
supra note 2, at 394 & n. 342 (stating that a court would most likely not order a home
study where a legal parent consents to adoption by her spouse).
243. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT §§ 2-201–2-207, 9 U.L.A. 40–45 (Part IA 1994).
244. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/13(B)(a) (2008).
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for placement of a child.”245 Indeed, one might argue that because
the state is so deeply invested and interested in the status of its
citizens, it declines to rely on party presentation of the facts in
adoption proceedings, but rather undertakes “an independent
investigation of the facts and applicable legal standards.”246
In addition to requiring an evaluation by a qualified professional of
the prospective adoptive parent, the UAA requires notice of the
adoption proceeding to a number of interested persons, including
those whose consent is required; certain putative fathers; those with
legal or physical custody of, or a right to visit, the child; and any
person who “can provide information that is relevant to the proposed
adoption and that the court in its discretion wants to hear.”247 This
notice provision is designed to provide the court with access to
relevant information in the hands of non-parties.
Thus, the first premise underlying the unreliability rationale is
correct to the extent that it posits that adoption proceedings are
typically non-adversarial in nature. But it elides the critical roles
played by impartial professionals, who gather evidence regarding
parental fitness; other interested persons, who share data that inform
the court’s judgment; and the judge, who adjudicates the
proceedings. The active participation of these non-parties helps
ensure the thorough fact-finding and informed decision-making
associated with adversary processes.
b.

Do courts fail to apply the law of the most interested state?

The second premise underlying the unreliability rationale is that
courts entertaining adoption petitions apply the forum state’s
adoption law without considering the policies underlying the laws of
other states that may claim a greater interest in the adoption. As
mentioned previously, it is widely accepted that the court in the
forum state may apply its own law in adoption proceedings.248 But to
245. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(20)(A) (2006).
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 31 cmt. a (1982); see also id. cmt. b
(stating that the state’s “supervisory interest in the personal and social relationships
associated with status . . . . is expressed in rules usually requiring that legal formation
and dissolution of status be officially reviewed and approved”).
247. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-401, 9 U.L.A. 77–78 (Part IA 1994).
248. See supra note 153 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Adoption House, Inc.
v. P.M., No. 02-12-07TN, 00-37796, 2003 WL 23354141, at *13 (Del. Fam. Ct. Oct. 9,
2003) (applying the forum state’s laws even though the mother’s consent was
executed in another state); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 769 A.2d 508, 511 (Pa.
Super. 2001) (recognizing the “dominant interest of the forum state in fixing the
prospective adoptive child’s status and relationships”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 289 (1971) (“A court applies its own local law in
determining whether to grant an adoption.”); Interstate Compact on the Placement
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the extent that the premise implies that the F1 court fails to apply the
law of the most interested state, it is subject to question for at least
three reasons. First, in many cases, the birth parents, the child, and
the prospective adoptive parents all reside in the same state (F1); the
child is born there; and the birth parents execute their consents
there. In such purely domestic cases, there is no argument that
another state’s law should apply so the lack of an adversarial contest
is, for these purposes, irrelevant.
If, some time after entry of a final adoption decree, the adoptive
family were to move to F2, the law of which bars adoption by gays and
lesbians, F1’s adoption decree might be deemed to violate F2’s public
policy. But the lack of an adversarial contest regarding choice of law
in the F1 proceeding would add nothing to the public policy
rationale discussed in Part IV.A above, because on these facts, no
litigant in even the most hotly contested adoption proceeding would
have had reason to argue for the application of F2 law. In fact, on
this (not uncommon) set of facts, it would have violated both the Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses of the Constitution for the
F1 adoption court to have applied the law of any state other than F1:
“[F]or a State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally
permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”249
Where all members of the adoption triad reside in F1, the child is
born there, and the consents are executed there, no other state has a
significant contact creating a state interest that would render choice
of its adoption law constitutional.
Second, statutory restrictions on the jurisdiction of courts
entertaining adoption petitions ensure that only states that have a
meaningful connection with the adoption triad have authority to
adjudicate adoption cases and to apply their adoption laws.250 For
example, the UAA’s goal is to have adoption proceedings “heard in
the forum with the closest connections to, and the most substantial

of Children art. III(a) (the “ICPC”) (2002), available at http://icpc.aphsa.org/
Home/resources.asp (requiring compliance with the laws of the receiving state).
249. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494–95 (2003) (citing Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985)); see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (holding that a state must have a significant contact or
aggregation of contacts for the application of its own substantive law to comport
with the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses).
250. See supra notes 148–151 & 202; infra notes 251–256 & 295 and accompanying
text; Whitten, supra note 13, at 825–26.
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evidence about, the proposed adoptive family.”251 Accordingly, the
UAA permits an assertion of jurisdiction by a court in the state in
which the child has lived with a parent, guardian, or prospective
adoptive parent for at least six months immediately preceding
commencement of the adoption proceeding, or, in the case of a child
less than six months old, in the state in which the child has lived
“from soon after birth” with a parent, guardian, or prospective
adoptive parent and “there is available in this State substantial
evidence concerning the minor’s present or future care.”252 Similarly,
the UCCJA, which some courts apply in determining whether they
have jurisdiction to adjudicate adoption proceedings,253 “limits . . .
jurisdiction to the state where the child has his home or where there
are other strong contacts with the child and his family.”254
Moreover, the Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws provides
that
[a] state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to grant an
adoption if (a) it is the state of domicil of either the adopted child
or the adoptive parent, and (b) the adoptive parent and either the
adopted child or the person having legal custody of the child are
subject to its personal jurisdiction.255

Thus, while adoption courts may not routinely perform
independent choice-of-law analyses, statutory restrictions on
jurisdiction ensure that they entertain petitions to adopt and apply
their law only if they have a significant relationship with the parties or
the issues, which is the very objective of the most widely followed
choice-of-law approach (embodied in the Second Restatement of
Conflicts).256

251. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, The Uniform Adoption Act: Reporter’s Ruminations, 30
FAM. L.Q. 345, 369 (1996).
252. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-101(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 67 (Part IA 1994); see id.
§§ 3-101(a)(2)–(3).
253. See supra note 150.
254. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 264 (1968)
(emphasis added); see UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3(a)(1)–(2), 9 U.L.A.
307 (1968) (listing the situations in which a court has jurisdiction to decide child
custody matters); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT § 103, 9 U.L.A.
660 (1997) (stating that the UCCJEA “does not govern an adoption proceeding”).
255. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 78 (1971).
256. The Second Restatement of Conflicts directs courts in many types of cases to
apply “the local law of the state which, with respect to [a particular] issue, has the
most significant relationship to [the transaction or] occurrence and the parties.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145(1) & 188(1) (1971); see
Whitten, supra note 13, at 817 (concluding that “it is difficult to see how the
application of the law of the forum in an adoption case could infringe the interests
of another state to the extent necessary to violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
even under a more rigorous test than the one applied by the plurality in Allstate”).
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Third, while it is generally true that courts entertaining adoption
petitions apply forum law, several courts have acknowledged that
“[c]ircumstances might permit or compel a state exercising adoption
jurisdiction to defer to the substantial and dominant interest of a
foreign state and to apply the law of that state in deciding some or all
of the issues.”257 For example, in determining the revocability of a
consent executed outside the forum state, the adoption court may
apply the law of the state in which the consent was executed rather
than the law of the state in which the adoption proceeding is
pending. In In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action,258 the birth
parents executed consents in Arkansas, where the prospective
adoptive parents were living at the time.259 Although the prospective
adoptive parents later moved to Arizona and filed a petition to adopt
there, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s choice of
Arkansas law to govern the revocation question, noting that “[f]rom
the beginning it was expected that the adoption would take place in
Arkansas pursuant to the law of that state. The consent form was
captioned and drawn for filing in an Arkansas court. The parties had
been advised of their rights based upon Arkansas law.”260 Thus,
although it is rarely employed, courts retain the flexibility to apply
the law of another state that claims a greater interest in the parties
and the proposed adoption than the forum state.261
The second premise, then, both overstates the risk that, due to the
uncontested nature of many adoption proceedings, a court will apply
the adoption law of a state that lacks a significant connection to the
adoption triad and understates the court’s flexibility to choose the
adoption law of another, potentially more interested, state.

257. In re Baby Girl P., 802 A.2d 1192, 1194 (N.H. 2002) (quoting In re Adoption
of Child by T.W.C., 636 A.2d 1083, 1090 (N.J. Super. 1994)); see 1 HOLLINGER, supra
note 13, § 4.07[4] (explaining the relationship between subject matter jurisdiction
and substantive laws concerning consent, relinquishment, and termination in
adoption proceedings).
258. 577 P.2d 714 (Ariz. 1978) (en banc).
259. Id. at 714–16.
260. Id. at 716.
261. To the extent it provides that “the state from which the placement is made
may . . . evaluate a projected placement before it is made,” the ICPC appears to
contemplate application of the sending state’s law and may limit the potential for
prospective adoptive parents to evade the law of the state with the most significant
interest in the adoption. See, e.g., In re Adoption No. 10087, 597 A.2d 456, 462–63
(Md. Ct. App. 1991).
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3.

Claims advanced by the unreliability rationale
With these reservations about the premises underlying the
unreliability rationale in mind, let us turn to the claims advanced by
the unreliability rationale.
a.

Are determinations underlying adoption decrees entitled to issue
preclusive effect?

The unreliability rationale’s first claim is that the legal and factual
determinations underlying adoption decrees are typically not entitled
to issue preclusive effect.262 According to section 27 of the Second
Restatement of Judgments, “[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually
litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is
conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties.”263 As a
comment elaborates, an issue is “actually litigated” when it “is
properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for
determination, and is determined.”264 The Restatement further
appears to require that, in order for an issue to be accorded issue
preclusive effect, it must have been “actually litigated and
determined” in the context of an adversarial proceeding.265 In
addition to the “between the parties” language in section 27 itself,266 a
comment explicitly states that “issue preclusion is operative where the
second action is between the same persons who were parties to the
prior action, and who were adversaries . . . with respect to the particular
issue.”267 Furthermore, as another comment explains, “[t]he concept
of adversarial litigation is that determination of issues is not full and
fair unless a party has an opportunity to present proofs and argument
specifically directed to the matters in controversy.”268
262. Wardle, supra note 16, at 584–85; see also Whitten, supra note 13, at 844.
263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); accord United States v.
Int’l Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 506 (1953) (requiring an adjudication on the merits in
order for a determination to have issue preclusive effect).
264. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. d (1982). Another comment
adds that “[a] judgment is not conclusive in a subsequent action as to issues which
might have been but were not litigated and determined in the prior action.” Id. § 27
cmt. e. This rule, which assures litigants that stipulated facts will not be binding
upon them in subsequent litigation, encourages the parties to reduce the acrimony
and breadth of a lawsuit, thereby promoting both civility and judicial economy. Id.
265. Id. § 27.
266. See supra text accompanying note 263.
267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. a (1982) (emphasis added).
268. Id. § 38 cmt. a. “Issue preclusion will not apply if “the party sought to be
precluded . . . did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and
fair adjudication in the initial action.” Id. § 28(5)(c); see In re Keaty, 397 F.3d 264,
272 (5th Cir. 2005) (requiring that the issue have been “contested by the parties”);
Sunny Acres Villa, Inc. v. Cooper, 25 P.3d 44, 47 (Colo. 2001) (requiring that the
party to be precluded have had an incentive to litigate vigorously).

2008]

ARE YOU STILL MY MOTHER?

47

Adoption petitions are not granted on the basis of stipulated facts.
The petitioner files a pleading, and the court holds a hearing to
determine whether or not the adoption is in the child’s best
interests.269 The adoption statute may require the court to make
additional findings regarding service of notice, execution of consents,
and parental suitability, among other issues, before granting the
petition.270 While these issues are “raised[] by the pleadings . . .
submitted for determination, and . . . determined” by the court and
therefore appear to be “actually litigated,” they often are determined
in the context of non-adversarial proceedings.271
In some contexts, courts have accorded issue preclusive effect to
findings rendered in the absence of a full adversarial contest. For
example, where a defendant answers the complaint, denying its
material allegations, but then defaults and the court enters a
judgment after a trial at which the plaintiff offers evidence, courts
have precluded the defendant from (re)litigating the issues decided
against it.272 Likewise, where a divorce decree incorporates an
agreement between the spouses stating that a child is the issue of the
marriage, courts have precluded the parties from later litigating the
child’s paternity.273 But even if courts occasionally accord issue
preclusive effect to findings made in non-adversarial proceedings, it
seems reasonable to question whether findings made in uncontested
adoption proceedings (without even a nominal adversary) should be
accorded issue preclusive effect.
Even if we accept the first claim of the unreliability rationale—
judicial findings made in uncontested adoption proceedings are (or
should be) denied issue preclusive effect—the crux of the interstate
269. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8612(a) & (c) (West 2004); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
50/14(e) (2008); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 112-a(2) & 114(1) (McKinney 2008); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 162.014(a) & 162.016(b) (Vernon 2002); see also UNIF. ADOPTION
ACT §§ 3-701 & 3-703(a), 9 U.L.A. 93 (1994).
270. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-703(a), 9 U.L.A. 94 (Part IA 1994).
271. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., In re Gober, 100 F.3d 1195, 1205 (5th Cir. 1996) (precluding the
litigant from relitigation when he had been actively participating in the litigation for
the last two years); In re Garner, 56 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other
grounds, In re Caton, 157 F.3d 1026, 1030 n.18 (5th Cir. 1998) (differentiating
between a simple default judgment, where no answer is pled and the defendant is
presumed to have admitted all the facts of the case, and a post-answer default
judgment, where the merits of the case must still be decided at the hearing); see also
18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4442, at 243
(2d ed. 2002) (stating that “[i]t is far from clear that issue preclusion should be
denied simply because the . . . trial [following a post-answer default] was one-sided”)
(footnote omitted).
273. See, e.g., Collier v. State, 454 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Doe v.
Doe, 52 P.3d 255, 265 (Haw. 2002); Pratt v. Pratt, 84 P.3d 545, 550 (Haw. Ct. App.
2004).
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recognition issue remains. That is because, as Part II demonstrates,
the central question is not whether an adoption decree precludes
relitigation of an issue that was previously litigated, but rather whether
the decree itself—and the alteration in personal status that it
effects—must be recognized in other states. Put differently, the
question is whether sister states must recognize the
“transformational” effect of an adoption decree.
In their treatise on civil procedure, Professors Geoffrey Hazard,
John Leubsdorf, and the late Fleming James refer to judgments that
determine personal status as transformational because they
“transform[] a legal relationship”:274
A judgment transforms or confirms legal relations between the
parties to the action in a way that others must recognize, at least
until they come forward to assert their own claims through
litigation. . . . If a married couple is divorced, the change in their
marital status ordinarily may not be contested by others . . . .
These effects on the nonparty are not the result of res judicata
rules as such. They flow from the fact that a judgment not only
determines issues and claims but also may redefine the
relationships of the parties to the litigation with respect to each
other . . . . For nonparties, the judgment thus operates much like a
privately negotiated contract or conveyance.275

In other words, just as neighbors are “bound,” as a practical matter,
if landowner A sells her property to landowner B—they can no longer
seek to hold landowner A responsible for maintenance of the
property—so the broader community is “bound” if an adoption
decree creates a new family.276 As Professor Homer Clark explained,
The reasons for giving adoption the broad effect indicated are that
the relationship of parent and child is basic in society, it concerns
the immediate parties more intimately than anyone else, and once
274. JAMES ET AL., supra note 184, at 30.
275. Id. at 715; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 31(2) (1982) (stating
that a judgment in an action determining or changing a person’s status is conclusive
upon all other persons regarding that status—subject to certain qualifications, such
as a person entitled under substantive law to contest the status, such as a birth
mother, is not bound unless she was afforded an opportunity to be a party); id. § 31
cmt. f (stating that “[a] status determination is ordinarily binding on non-parties
because it effects a transformation of the legal status of the person involved which
others have no legal authority to challenge”).
276. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 138, at 194 (stating that a judgment that
alters status “determines, conclusively with regard to the parties and usually with
regard to all other persons as well, the status in question”); 2 HOMER H. CLARK, JR.,
THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 21.12, at 691 (2d ed. 1988)
(stating that “[a] decree of adoption rendered with jurisdiction is binding with
respect to the parent-child relationship which it creates not only upon those who are
parties to the proceeding but upon all other persons”) (footnote omitted).
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the parent-child relationship is established by the adoption decree
everyone must be able to rely upon it.277

The transformational effect of the adoption decree is not mitigated
by the non-adversarial nature of the proceedings. After all, even
marriages278 and wholly consensual, private transactions, like real
estate sales, have this transformational effect, as do ex parte divorce
decrees.279 Once the family relationship is created (or altered, as in
the case of divorce), the need for stability in family relations demands
that the status be recognized elsewhere regardless of whether the
proceeding was adversarial.
As a comment to the Second
Restatement of Judgments explains,
The form of these proceedings reflects the state’s interest in that
they are conducted with the sole or principal purpose of
determining status and with a view to making a determination that
can be taken as a firm legal premise in all matters in which the
status may subsequently be significant. The court usually acts not
only as arbiter but as monitor in behalf of a public interest.280

Thus, while the unreliability rationale’s first claim—that the legal
and factual determinations underlying adoption decrees are not
typically entitled to issue preclusive effect—is accurate, it does not
alter the obligation of sister states to recognize the transformational
effect of adoption decrees.
b.

Are final adoption decrees entitled to full faith and credit if the
rendering court failed to apply the law of the most interested state?

The second claim made by the unreliability rationale is more
questionable. To the extent that the unreliability rationale posits that
final adoption decrees are not entitled to full faith and credit because
the rendering court may not have applied the law of the most
interested state, it is clearly inconsistent with precedent. The
Supreme Court has long held that judgments are entitled to full faith
and credit even if they embody or reflect significant errors by the
rendering court. In Fauntleroy v. Lum,281 for example, the Supreme
277. 2 CLARK, supra note 276, § 21.12, at 691.
278. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 31 cmt. f (1982) (comparing
status determinations with “status changes that parties are free to make without
adjudicative proceedings, such as entry into marriage”).
279. See Williams I, 317 U.S. 287, 298–99, 301–02 (1942) (discussing the binding
nature of ex parte divorce decrees). But cf. Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and
Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 818, 821–23 (2000) (questioning the
constitutionality of the status exception to standard rules governing personal
jurisdiction). The transformational effect of same-sex marriages is limited outside
the state of celebration by the DOMA and state DOMAs.
280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 31 cmt. b (1982).
281. 210 U.S. 230 (1908); see discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
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Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required Mississippi
to enforce a Missouri judgment even if the judgment “was based
upon a mistake of law” or “went upon a misapprehension of the
Mississippi law.”282 In fact, even if the rendering court makes a
mistake of constitutional dimension—by applying its own law in
violation of the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and Credit
Clause or by failing to recognize a sister-state judgment in violation of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause—its judgment is nevertheless
entitled to recognition in other states under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.283
It may be that the rendering state’s failure to apply another state’s
law forbidding adoption by gays and lesbians may result from the
parties’ conscious choice of a sympathetic forum and their
acquiescence in (if not encouragement of) the application of
favorable forum law.
Because the adoption proceeding is
uncontested, no litigant advocates the policy against adoption by gays
and lesbians embodied in the law of another potentially interested
state. But the forum’s failure to consider or apply the law of a more
interested jurisdiction does not deprive the judgment of its preclusive
effect.
Judgments in non-adversarial proceedings are entitled to interstate
recognition even if the law of an interested state was overlooked
because no litigant encouraged the court to apply it.284 Supreme
Court precedent establishes that consent judgments are entitled to
claim preclusive effect in the rendering state and, under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and statute, in sister states and in federal

282. Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 237 (citations omitted); see Am. Express Co. v. Mullins,
212 U.S. 311, 314 (1909) (“A judgment is conclusive as to all the media concludendi;
and it needs no authority to show that it cannot be impeached either in or out of the
State by showing that it was based upon a mistake of the law.”) (quoting Fauntleroy,
210 U.S. at 237) (internal citation omitted).
283. See, e.g., Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 76–78 (1939); Thoma
v. Thoma, 934 P.2d 1066, 1070–71 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996); Hamilton v. SCM Corp.,
334 N.W.2d 688, 692 (Wis. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 106 (1971) (“A judgment will be recognized and enforced in other states even
though an error of fact or of law was made in the proceedings before
judgment . . . .”); see also Whitten, supra note 13, at 817 (“The parties to the adoption
proceeding would . . . be precluded from attacking a judgment of adoption in
another state on the grounds that the judgment-rendering state incorrectly or
unconstitutionally applied its own law, even if such an objection would have been
available in the adoption proceeding itself.”).
284. See 2 CLARK, supra note 276, § 21.12, at 692 (stating that sister-state adoption
decrees “should be recognized pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause
regardless of differences in the law of adoption and in fact some courts have done so
even where the forum law would not have authorized the granting of an adoption
under the circumstances”) (footnotes omitted).
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court,285 even if the parties acquiesced in the application of forum
law. For example, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein,286 a
Delaware state court entered a judgment approving the settlement of
a class action, which purported to settle all claims arising out of the
contested conduct, including claims under the federal securities laws,
which the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate.287 Having concluded that, under Delaware law, the state
court judgment would have precluded litigation of claims within the
federal court’s exclusive jurisdiction, the Supreme Court then
considered whether the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the
Securities Exchange Act effected a partial repeal of section 1738, the
full faith and credit statute.288 This step would have been unnecessary
unless section 1738 compels courts to give claim preclusive effect to
consent judgments entered without consideration or application of
the law of an interested jurisdiction.
Even in the context of divorce litigation—where the state’s interest
in its citizens is very strong—the Supreme Court has held that a
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit as long as the rendering
court had jurisdiction, even if the proceeding was non-adversarial and
no one questioned the forum’s application of its own divorce law.289
This is true even though divorce proceedings alter the civil status of
the litigants: courts entertaining divorce actions typically apply
forum law without considering the possibility that another state might
claim a greater interest in the parties or their marriage,290 and divorce
actions can be uncontested and non-adversarial.

285. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996)
(holding that a federal court cannot withhold full faith and credit from a state-court
judgment “simply because the settlement releases claims within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts”); Laylor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322,
327 (1955) (concluding that a dismissal with prejudice had res judicata effect);
United States v. Int’l Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 506 (1953) (concluding that a consent
judgment had res judicata effect); see also CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 138, at 82
(stating that the doctrine of claim preclusion applies to default judgments and
dismissals); 18A WRIGHT, supra note 272, § 4443, at 265 (stating that generally, a
consent judgment will sustain a claim preclusion).
286. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
287. 516 U.S. at 370–72.
288. Id. at 380.
289. See generally Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (holding that a
divorce decree granted in Nevada to North Carolina residents that met the
requirements of procedural due process of law was entitled to full faith and credit in
North Carolina, even though the decree conflicted with North Carolina policy).
290. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 285 (1971) (“The
local law of the domiciliary state in which the action is brought will be applied to
determine the right to divorce.”); 2 CLARK, supra note 276, § 14.1, at 2; SCOLES, supra
note 13, § 15.4, at 630–31); Rhonda Wasserman, Divorce and Domicile: Time to Sever the
Knot, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 13, 19 & n.82, 20 & n.86 (1997).
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The concern articulated by Professor Currie—that the parties may
collude to bring a status proceeding in a jurisdiction with law that
contravenes the policy of their home state291—is legitimate. But the
adoption court will have jurisdiction to entertain an adoption
petition and authority to apply its own adoption law only if it has a
meaningful connection with the adoption triad.292 The home study,
which is prepared by an impartial professional to assess the quality of
the home to be provided by the prospective adoptive parents, should
uncover cases in which the petitioners lack any meaningful
connection to the forum state. And the availability of a collateral
attack for judgments rendered without jurisdiction may assuage
Professor Currie’s concerns. It is to the jurisdictional rationale for
non-recognition that we now turn.
C. The Jurisdictional Rationale
The jurisdictional rationale maintains that adoption decrees
rendered by courts lacking subject matter jurisdiction are not entitled
to recognition in other states.293 The jurisdictional rationale rests on
three prongs: first, the judgment of a court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction is not entitled to full faith and credit; second, the
enforcing court itself is free to determine whether the rendering
court had subject matter jurisdiction; and third, in determining
whether the rendering court had subject matter jurisdiction, the
enforcing court is not bound by the jurisdictional findings, if any,
made by the rendering court itself. This Article will unpack each of
these prongs in turn.
Before doing so, let us first differentiate between the two distinct
meanings of the term “subject matter jurisdiction.” First, true subject
matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s competence to adjudicate a
general type of dispute, such as controversies between citizens of
different states or disputes in which the amount in controversy is less
(or more) than a given monetary amount.294 Second, in the context
of litigation affecting family status, courts, legislatures and scholars
also use the term subject matter jurisdiction to refer to the required
291. Currie, supra note 182, at 7.
292. See supra notes 148–151, 250–256 and accompanying text.
293. See, e.g., Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56, 58–59 (Neb. 2002) (describing
the trial court’s refusal to recognize a sister-state adoption decree for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction).
294. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (7th ed. 1999); see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 11 & cmt. a (1982) (defining subject matter jurisdiction); CASAD &
CLERMONT, supra note 138, at 250 (same). Professor Whitten refers to this type of
subject matter jurisdiction as “local subject matter jurisdiction.” Whitten, supra note
13, at 818–19.
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nexus between the rendering state and the individuals whose status is
in issue, which ensures that the state has a sufficient interest to make
a status determination.295 I have previously expressed reservations
about the appropriateness of a subject matter jurisdiction label to
describe this nexus.296 But because courts, legislatures and family law
scholars have treated this nexus as a subject matter jurisdiction
requirement, we shall refer to it as territorial subject matter jurisdiction.
Although different complications may arise regarding true and
territorial subject matter jurisdiction respectively, at bottom the
jurisdictional rationale maintains that a lack of either type of subject
matter jurisdiction renders an adoption decree vulnerable to
collateral attack in the enforcing state.
In the first instance, the legislature or even the governing
constitution determines a court’s true subject matter jurisdiction.297
While courts sometimes use the term “jurisdictional” to refer to time
restrictions in procedural rules and other non-jurisdictional
requirements,298 the Supreme Court has been critical of the practice,
calling it “confounding,”299 “anomalous,”300 and “less than
meticulous.”301 Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to “describe[]
such unrefined dispositions as ‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings’ that
should be accorded ‘no precedential effect’ on the question whether
the . . . court had authority to adjudicate the claim in suit.”302
295. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 112 (1963) (citing Sherrer v. Sherrer,
334 U.S. 343 (1948), and Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938), as examples of cases
involving challenges to the rendering court’s subject matter jurisdiction); In re
Marriage of Newsome, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 555, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (identifying the
UCCJA as “[t]he exclusive method of determining subject matter jurisdiction in
custody cases in California”) (citation omitted); Whitten, supra note 13, at 825
(explaining that territorial connections for adoption jurisdiction are characterized as
subject-matter jurisdiction); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. b
(1982) (“When a court exercises jurisdiction based on a relationship to a thing . . . it
may be said that the thing . . . is the ‘subject matter’ of the adjudication.”); supra
notes 250–256 (describing statutory requirements for jurisdiction in adoption
proceedings).
296. Wasserman, supra note 279, at 857 n.225.
297. See, e.g., Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004) (stating that “[o]nly
Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction”).
298. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960) (“The courts
have uniformly held that the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is
mandatory and jurisdictional.”); see also Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 454 (noting that
“[c]ourts . . . have more than occasionally used the term ‘jurisdictional’ to describe
emphatic time prescriptions in rules of court”); cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for A Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (observing that the term “jurisdiction” has too many
meanings).
299. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455.
300. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 434 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
301. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006); see also id. at 510
(admitting that the Court “has sometimes been profligate in its use of the term
[‘jurisdiction’]”).
302. Id. at 511 (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 91).
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Although not always following its own advice,303 the Supreme Court
has urged courts and litigants to restrict use of the term
“jurisdictional” to “prescriptions delineating the classes of cases
(subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction)
Thus, in
falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.”304
determining whether a court has true subject matter jurisdiction, the
central question is whether the court has authority to decide disputes
of the general class presented.
1.

Prong 1: Judgments rendered without subject matter jurisdiction are not
entitled to full faith and credit
With this understanding of subject matter jurisdiction in mind, let
us turn to the first prong of the jurisdictional rationale, which posits
that a judgment rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction is not
entitled to full faith and credit. This prong is well accepted. The
Supreme Court has often stated that the judgment of a court lacking
subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the matter before it is not
entitled to full faith and credit.305 This principle is codified in both
the Second Restatement of Judgments306 and in the Second
Restatement of Conflicts.307 Since a judgment rendered by a court
lacking competence is void in the rendering state itself, this prong of

303. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2363–66 (2007) (characterizing a
statutory time limit for taking an appeal as “mandatory and jurisdictional”); see also
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 753 (2008) (noting that
the Court has “often read the time limits of . . . statutes as more absolute,” and “[a]s
convenient shorthand, . . . has sometimes referred to [them] as ‘jurisdictional’”
(citation omitted)).
304. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455; accord Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 504
(2006); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 414 (2004). But see Bowles, 127 S. Ct.
at 2362, 2366 (holding that a statutory time limit for filing an appeal was
jurisdictional).
305. See, e.g., Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health
Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691, 704–05 (1982); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421
(1979); Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 110 (1963); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S.
457, 464–69 (1873); see also CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 138, at 250 (making clear
that the law allows for collateral attacks when a court lacked jurisdiction); RICHMAN
& REYNOLDS, supra note 211, § 115[d] (stating that a court must have jurisdiction for
its judgment to be entitled to full faith and credit); cf. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455 n.9
(stating that “[e]ven subject-matter jurisdiction . . . may not be attacked collaterally”)
(citation omitted).
306. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 81 (1982) (“[T]he court
rendering the judgment [must] have had territorial jurisdiction and jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the action . . . .”); see also id. §§ 1, 11, 12, 65 & 69.
307. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 105 (1971) (“A
judgment rendered by a court lacking competence to render it and for that reason
subject to collateral attack in the state of rendition will not be recognized or
enforced in other states.”).
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the jurisdictional rationale merely establishes that other states need
not recognize or enforce it either.308
But if it is well accepted that a judgment rendered without
jurisdiction is not entitled to full faith and credit, it is equally well
established that a judgment is impervious to collateral attack where
the rendering court had jurisdiction but erred in making a finding of
fact or conclusion of law that did not go to its jurisdiction.309 Rather,
any mistake that a rendering court makes in the interpretation or
application of substantive law, in choice of law, in an evidentiary
ruling, or even in a decision to accord or deny a prior judgment full
faith and credit must be corrected (if at all) on appeal or through an
alternate method of direct review, such as a motion to vacate.
Mistakes that do not affect the court’s jurisdiction cannot be raised
collaterally (in the rendering state or in a sister state).310 Thus, the
jurisdictional rationale is available only where the rendering court
lacked jurisdiction, not where it made a mistake of substantive law.311
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that in some cases
there may be difficulty distinguishing between limitations on a court’s
subject matter jurisdiction and limitations on a party’s right to
recover under substantive law,312 it nevertheless has emphasized the
importance of the difference:
[T]he [theoretical] distinction between the two is plain. One goes
to the power, the other only to the duty, of the court. . . . Whether
a given statute is intended simply to establish a rule of substantive
law, and thus to define the duty of the court, or is meant to limit its
power, is a question of construction and common sense. When it
affects a court of general jurisdiction, and deals with a matter upon
which that court must pass, we naturally are slow to read
308. See id. at cmt. a (noting that a judgment by a court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction will not be recognized in other states); Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co.,
455 U.S. at 704 n.10 (noting that a state may refuse to enforce a sister state judgment
rendered without jurisdiction).
309. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 106 (1971) (“A
judgment will be recognized and enforced in other states even though an error of
fact or of law was made in the proceedings before judgment . . . .”); RICHMAN &
REYNOLDS, supra note 211, § 114, at 375 (explaining that a decision by a court with
proper jurisdiction will be entitled to full faith and credit, even if it embodies a
mistake of law or fact).
310. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 211, § 114, at 375.
311. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513–14 (2006) (emphasizing
the distinction between “jurisdictional” and “merits” issues); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. e (1982) (analyzing the distinction between a lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and “mere error”).
312. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516 (distinguishing between matters that concern
jurisdiction and matters that concern the merits of a case); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210
U.S. 230, 234–35 (1908) (“No doubt it sometimes may be difficult to decide whether
certain words in a statute are directed to jurisdiction or to merits . . . .”).
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ambiguous words as meaning to leave the judgment open to
dispute, or as intended to do more than to fix the rule by which the
court should decide.313

Thus, while legislatures are free to define particular statutory
requirements as jurisdictional,314 when they fail to do so explicitly,
courts should refrain from treating them as jurisdictional.315 This is
so because the consequences of labeling a requirement as
jurisdictional are so significant: a jurisdictional requirement cannot
be waived or forfeited; the rendering court must raise jurisdictional
issues sua sponte; the judge, rather than the jury, may determine
contested jurisdictional facts; and, if the jurisdictional defect is not
identified until after judgment is rendered, precious judicial
resources will be wasted if the judgment is set aside for lack of
jurisdiction.316
Returning to the matter at hand, if a state statute were to deny
courts jurisdiction to approve adoption petitions submitted by gay
individuals or same-sex couples (and if such a statute were to
withstand a constitutional challenge), then a judgment of a court in
that state approving an adoption petition in favor of a gay individual
or same-sex couple would be subject to collateral attack for lack of
jurisdiction—at least in the absence of a (mistaken) determination by
But statutory
the rendering court that it had jurisdiction.317
restrictions on parental qualifications to adopt that are not explicitly
jurisdictional in nature should not be construed as limiting a court’s
competence or authority to grant adoptions, but rather—in the
Supreme Court’s words—as defining its duty.318 In other words, if a
court with authority to entertain adoption petitions were to finalize a
313. Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 235; see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523
U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (stating that “the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable)
cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case”) (citation omitted); Cement
Masons Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Stone, 197 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 1999)
(distinguishing between a dismissal on the merits and a dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction); Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56, 62 (Neb. 2002) (Gerrard, J.,
concurring) (same).
314. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514 (conceding that “Congress could make the
employee-numerosity requirement [of Title VII] ‘jurisdictional,’ just as it has made
an amount-in-controversy threshold an ingredient of subject-matter jurisdiction”).
315. See id. at 516 (stating that “when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation
on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional
in character”).
316. See id. at 514–15.
317. See infra part IV.C.3 (considering whether the rendering court’s
determination that it has jurisdiction may be reexamined in the enforcing court).
318. Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 234–35 (distinguishing between jurisdiction, which
“goes to the power” of the court, and the merits, which go “only to the duty, of the
court”).
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second-parent adoption, notwithstanding a statutory duty to approve
adoption petitions only if both biological parents relinquished their
parental rights, the court would retain subject matter jurisdiction and
its decree would be entitled to full faith and credit. The mistake
would have to be corrected on appeal or by way of a motion to open
the judgment in the rendering court.319
It is precisely this distinction between jurisdiction and duty that
Justice Gerrard of the Nebraska Supreme Court emphasized in his
concurring opinion in Russell v. Bridgens,320 the child custody case
described above.321 There, a Pennsylvania court granted a petition to
adopt, submitted by a woman who previously had adopted the child,
along with the woman’s same-sex partner. Years after the second
adoption petition was granted, the women separated and one sued
the other in a Nebraska court seeking child custody. The original
adoptive mother argued that the Pennsylvania court in the second
adoption proceeding had failed to comply with the Pennsylvania
adoption statute by failing to require the relinquishment of her
parental rights before approving the co-parent adoption.322 This
mistake, she argued, deprived the Pennsylvania court of subject
matter jurisdiction and rendered its judgment subject to collateral
attack. The Nebraska trial court agreed, concluding that the
Pennsylvania court “lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the
adoption and . . . therefore, the adoption was not entitled to full faith
and credit under the U.S. Constitution.”323 The Nebraska Supreme
Court reversed, concluding that the movant had not properly
supported the motion for summary judgment because she failed to

319. See In re Infant Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (finding
that an adoption decree entered by a court with both personal and subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be impeached collaterally); Schott v. Schott, 744 N.W.2d 85, 89
(Iowa 2008) (“Because it was a court of general jurisdiction, it necessarily had subject
matter jurisdiction to grant the adoptions. . . . Even if the [rendering] court . . .
misinterpreted Iowa’s adoption statute, the adoptions are not void.”) (citation
omitted); Goodson v. Castellanos, 214 S.W.3d 741, 748 (Tex. App. 2007) (stating that
even if the rendering court “erred in issuing the adoption decree, the error was
based on an erroneous construction of statutes, and the judgment would be based on
an erroneous holding of substantive law. These errors would not deprive the district
court of jurisdiction over the adoption and would not render the decree void.”)
(citations omitted).
320. See 647 N.W.2d 56, 61 (Neb. 2002) (Gerrard, J., concurring) (“I would,
however, reverse the judgment of the district court based on my view that the
Pennsylvania adoption decree was entered by a court with subject matter jurisdiction
and is entitled to full faith and credit in Nebraska.”).
321. See supra Part II.A (explaining the holding in Russell).
322. 647 N.W.2d at 58.
323. Id. (describing the district court’s decision).
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prove that she had not relinquished her parental rights in the
rendering court.324
In his concurrence, Justice Gerrard distinguished between subject
matter jurisdiction and the substantive relinquishment requirement.
Gerard concluded that because a Pennsylvania statute explicitly
granted the courts of common pleas original jurisdiction over
adoption proceedings,325 the rendering court “had jurisdiction over
adoption cases generally and entered a decree of adoption and that
decree became a final judgment not subject to collateral attack on
the ground of subject matter jurisdiction,” even if the rendering
court had erred by failing to require that the original adoptive
mother relinquish her parental rights.326 Thus, while the first prong
of the jurisdictional rationale is well accepted—the judgment of a
court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is not entitled to full faith
and credit—it does not permit collateral challenges for alleged
mistakes unrelated to the rendering court’s jurisdiction.
2.

Prong 2: The enforcing court may determine whether the rendering court
had subject matter jurisdiction
Like the first prong of the jurisdictional rationale, the second
prong is generally well accepted: the Supreme Court has long
recognized that “a court in one State, when asked to give effect to the
judgment of a court in another State, may constitutionally inquire
into the foreign court’s jurisdiction to render that judgment.”327
Thus, if a Nebraska court is asked to recognize an adoption finalized
in Pennsylvania, Nebraska may question whether the Pennsylvania
court in fact had competence over adoption proceedings and
whether it had the requisite connection to the parties to support
territorial subject matter jurisdiction.328
From a policy perspective, since collateral attacks for lack of
jurisdiction “almost always” question the court’s personal jurisdiction
324. Id. at 60.
325. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (West 2001) (identifying the proper court
in Pennsylvania for adoption proceedings).
326. Russell, 647 N.W.2d at 62 (Gerrard, J., concurring). It would have been ironic
if the Nebraska Supreme Court had concluded that the Pennsylvania trial court had
lacked subject matter jurisdiction given that, less than two months after Russell was
decided, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania adoption
statute “afford[ed] the trial court discretion to decree the adoption without
termination of the legal parent’s rights.” In re R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa.
2002).
327. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963).
328. See, e.g., Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health
Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691, 705 (1982) (explaining that full faith and credit does
not have to be given to a judgment if the rendering court lacked jurisdiction);
Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457, 469 (1873) (same).

2008]

ARE YOU STILL MY MOTHER?

59

over the defendant (rather than its subject matter jurisdiction),329 it
makes sense to permit the collateral attack to be raised outside the
rendering state. After all, a defendant who claims that it would be
unfair to compel her to defend before a court in the (distant and
inconvenient) rendering state should not have to travel there to
challenge personal jurisdiction; she should be free to question the
judgment’s invalidity in her home state “or at least in a forum no
more inconvenient to [her] than to the opposing party.”330
On the other hand, when a judgment is challenged for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, the fairness argument in favor of a
collateral challenge outside the rendering state is not as
compelling.331 It would not be unfair to compel the defendant to
travel to the rendering state to challenge subject matter jurisdiction,
since she presumably has minimum (or greater) contacts there. In
fact, as a comment to the Second Restatement of Judgments suggests,
“considerations of convenience and comity may indicate that the
attack should be resolved in the rendering court.”332 Since the
rendering state’s own law determines its jurisdiction and since courts
in the rendering state will be more familiar with its jurisdictional law
than courts in other states, arguably it would make more sense to
permit a court in the rendering state to review any challenge to
subject matter jurisdiction and to expect other states to respect and
honor that jurisdictional determination.
But even if the policy justification for permitting the enforcing
court to examine the rendering court’s subject matter jurisdiction is
weak, its authority to do so is well established. Thus, given existing
precedent, few would question a Nebraska court’s authority to
examine whether a Pennsylvania court had subject matter jurisdiction
when asked to recognize its adoption decree.
3.

Prong 3: The scope of the enforcing court’s inquiry
The real question, then, is the scope of the inquiry that the
enforcing court is permitted to make in assuring itself that the
rendering court had subject matter jurisdiction.333 To the extent that
the third prong of the jurisdictional rationale posits that the
enforcing court is free to reexamine the jurisdictional question
329. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 81 cmt. b (1982).
330. Id.
331. See id. (positing that the rendering court is the proper court to hear attacks
based on “lack of subject matter jurisdiction”).
332. Id.
333. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963) (stating that the Court has
“carefully delineated the permissible scope” of the enforcing court’s inquiry
regarding the rendering court’s jurisdiction).
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without regard to the findings of the rendering court, it is
unsupported by both doctrine and policy. A well-established body of
Supreme Court precedent establishes that “[t]he principles of res
judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues.”334
In particular, if a party appears before the rendering court and
contests either the court’s personal jurisdiction over her or its subject
matter jurisdiction, standard principles of issue preclusion bar her
from relitigating the jurisdictional issue in the rendering state.335
This doctrine advances the sound policy objectives that underlie
preclusion doctrine generally: finality, efficiency, and consistency
needed to maintain confidence in the integrity of the judicial
process.336
The Full Faith and Credit Clause and corresponding statute extend
this issue preclusive effect throughout the nation by requiring other
states to give the judgment the same issue preclusive effect that it
would have in the rendering state.337 As the Supreme Court stated in
Durfee v. Duke,338 “a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit—even
as to questions of jurisdiction—when the second court’s inquiry
discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and
finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment.”339
But the doctrine of issue preclusion, even bolstered by the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, is not likely to preclude relitigation of an
adoption court’s subject matter jurisdiction because, as established
above,340 factual and legal determinations are entitled to issue
preclusive effect only “[w]hen an issue . . . is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is
essential to the judgment.”341 As the unreliability rationale posits,
adoption proceedings are typically non-adversarial in nature,342 and it
is highly unlikely that either partner would challenge the adoption
334. Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar.
Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691, 706 (1982) (citations omitted).
335. See, e.g., Durfee, 375 U.S. at 111–14 (barring relitigation of the rendering
court’s subject matter jurisdiction); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 & 177 (1938)
(same); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938) (same); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling
Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1931) (same).
336. See, e.g., Durfee, 375 U.S. at 111–12 (stating that there should be an end to
litigation and that parties should be bound by the decisions of a court before which
they appeared); Baldwin, 283 U.S. at 525–26 (same).
337. See, e.g., Durfee, 375 U.S. at 109.
338. 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
339. Id. at 111; accord Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co., 455 U.S. at 704–05 (finding
that courts must fulfill the constitutional mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
by upholding the validity of decisions of other states’ courts).
340. See discussion Part IV.B.3.a.
341. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); see discussion supra Part
IV.B.3.a (discussing the “actually litigated” requirement for issue preclusion).
342. See supra notes 230–234 and accompanying text.
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court’s subject matter jurisdiction when submitting a second-parent
adoption petition. In the absence of an adversarial contest on the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction, any finding that the rendering
court might have made regarding its subject matter jurisdiction
would not (or might not) be entitled to issue preclusive effect in the
rendering state and, therefore, would not be binding in the
enforcing state.343
Even if the doctrine of issue preclusion does not preclude
reexamination of the rendering court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
however, the doctrine of claim preclusion may. As a general rule, a
defendant cannot seek to collaterally attack a judgment by raising
defenses that might have been raised in the first action.344 This
general rule applies even where the defendant seeks to challenge the
rendering court’s subject matter jurisdiction.345 For example, in
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank,346 the United States
Supreme Court considered whether bond holders could challenge,
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a federal court judgment that
had readjusted the indebtedness of the Chicot County Drainage
District (“District”).347 The District had issued bonds in 1924 but had
been in default since 1932. Pursuant to a federal bankruptcy statute
enacted in 1934, which authorized municipal debt readjustment, the
District had filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas, seeking approval of a plan pursuant to
which the Reconstruction Finance Corporation would purchase the
outstanding bonds from the bond holders. The decree approving
the plan provided bond holders with one year in which to submit
their claims but otherwise canceled the old bonds and enjoined the
bond holders from asserting claims on them.348

343. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e (1982) (explaining that
a judgment is not conclusive regarding issues that were not actually litigated); accord
Whitten, supra note 13, at 844 (arguing that in a non-adversarial proceeding, the
“actual litigation” requirement is likely not satisfied).
344. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18(2) (1982).
345. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 n.9 (1982) (stating, in dicta, that “[a] party that has had an opportunity to
litigate the question of subject-matter jurisdiction may not . . . reopen that question
in a collateral attack upon an adverse judgment”); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 377 (1940) (stating that “the authority to pass upon
[the court’s] own jurisdiction and its decree sustaining jurisdiction against attack,
while open to direct review, is res judicata in a collateral action” (citing Stoll v.
Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171, 172 (1938))).
346. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
347. Id. at 372, 376.
348. Id. at 373.
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Notwithstanding this decree, several bondholders later filed suit
against the District in the same court to recover on the old bonds.349
The District argued that the prior decree precluded the second suit.
In response, the bond holders contended that the decree was void
because after it was entered, the Supreme Court had declared
unconstitutional the federal bankruptcy law authorizing municipal
debt readjustment.350 In the bond holders’ view, the law struck down
was “inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the challenged decree.”351 Moreover,
because the federal court had been sitting as a bankruptcy court and
its jurisdiction had been limited by the statute later declared
unconstitutional, the bond holders argued that “the District Court
was without jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and hence its
decree is open to collateral attack.”352
In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court noted that, even
though all federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, they have
“authority . . . to determine whether or not they have jurisdiction to
entertain the cause and for this purpose to construe and apply the
statute under which they are asked to act”; their jurisdictional
determinations are “open to direct review[] [but] may not be assailed
collaterally.”353 If the bond holders had challenged the validity of the
statute or the court’s jurisdiction in the initial proceeding, the district
court’s “determination would have been final save as it was open to
direct review upon appeal.”354
The Court rejected the argument that the bond holders were
“privileged to remain quiet and raise [the jurisdictional defense] in a
subsequent suit,”355 noting that claim preclusion bars presentation
not only of matter actually presented in the earlier litigation, but also
of “any other available matter which might have been presented to
that end.”356 Since the bond holders could have questioned the
rendering court’s subject matter jurisdiction in the initial proceeding
(even though the Supreme Court had not yet declared the
underlying statute unconstitutional), they were bound by the
judgment and precluded from challenging the court’s jurisdiction in
a collateral proceeding.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Id. at 372–73.
Id. at 373-74.
Id. at 374 (citations omitted).
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id. at 378 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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If Chicot County demonstrates the limited scope of the inquiry that
an enforcing court is permitted to make in assuring itself that the
rendering court had true subject matter jurisdiction, a number of
other Supreme Court cases decided in the divorce context establish
the limited scope of the inquiry regarding the rendering court’s
territorial subject matter jurisdiction. In the divorce context, where
territorial subject matter jurisdiction is predicated upon the domicile
of one of the spouses in the rendering state,357 the Court has held
that a spouse who challenged the rendering court’s subject matter
jurisdiction in the rendering court could not relitigate jurisdiction in
a court of a different state.358 Likewise, the Court has held that a
spouse who appeared before the rendering court and had a “full
opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues” but failed to do so was
precluded from collaterally attacking the divorce decree in another
state for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.359 Indeed, the Court has
gone so far as to hold that a party served within the rendering state
(and therefore subject to personal jurisdiction) who declined to
enter an appearance is precluded from challenging the rendering
court’s territorial subject matter jurisdiction in a collateral
proceeding.360 Thus, both claim and issue preclusion apply to
jurisdictional determinations, thereby dramatically limiting the scope
of the inquiry that a court in the enforcing state may undertake to
determine whether or not the rendering court had subject matter
jurisdiction. In inter partes divorce cases in particular (where both
parties are subject to the rendering court’s personal jurisdiction), a
collateral attack for lack of territorial subject matter jurisdiction is
unavailing.361
Applying this body of precedent to the adoption context, it would
appear that as long as the parties to the adoption proceeding were
subject to the rendering court’s personal jurisdiction, they would be
precluded from later seeking to collaterally attack the judgment for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction whether or not they had
357. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 302(a)(1) (as amended 1973), 9A
U.L.A. 200 (1998) (stating that the court may enter a decree of dissolution of
marriage if one of the parties was domiciled in the state); Williams II, 325 U.S. 226,
229 (1945) (stating that “judicial power to grant a divorce—jurisdiction, strictly
speaking—is founded on domicil”); see also Wasserman, supra note 290 at 2, 19–20
(stating that the domicile rule, requiring at least one spouse to be domiciled in the
rendering state, is still broadly followed today).
358. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 351–52 (1948) (footnote omitted); Davis v.
Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938).
359. Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378, 384 (1948).
360. See Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 127–28 (1951).
361. See generally the principles outlined in Cook, 342 U.S. 126; Coe, 334 U.S. 378;
and Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343.
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challenged the rendering court’s jurisdiction in the original action.
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the enforcing court’s inquiry
regarding the rendering court’s jurisdiction would be exceedingly
narrow: it could ascertain whether the parties had been subject to
the rendering court’s personal jurisdiction or had appeared before
it.362
4.

Complications
Having conceded the jurisdictional rationale’s first two prongs and
having refuted the third, we are left with three important and
difficult complications. First, while the Supreme Court precedent
analyzed above suggests that the parties to the first action are
precluded from questioning the rendering court’s subject matter
jurisdiction in a collateral proceeding, a more difficult question is
whether a state whose court did not issue the judgment may deny it
full faith and credit if its independent examination reveals that the
rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Second and
related, while it makes sense to bar reexamination of jurisdictional
findings in cases where the initial litigation was adversarial in nature,
one may question the soundness of this approach where no party to
the initial proceeding had incentive to contest the court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. Third, while precedent severely limits the scope
of the enforcing court’s inquiry into the subject matter jurisdiction of
the rendering court, both the Supreme Court and the Second
Restatement of Judgments acknowledge exceptions in certain cases
involving true subject matter jurisdiction. Let us examine each of
these complications in turn.
a.

Challenge by the enforcing state itself

Ordinarily, only parties and those in privity with them are bound
by judgments. As the Supreme Court has frequently noted, “[i]t is a
violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant
who was not a party or a privy and therefore has never had an
opportunity to be heard.”363 Thus, while it is constitutional to bind
adoptive parents and other parties to an adoption proceeding by the
362. See Cook, 342 U.S. at 128–29.
363. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (citations
omitted); accord Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 471 (2000) (“[J]udicial
predictions about the outcome of hypothesized litigation cannot substitute for the
actual opportunity to defend that due process affords every party against whom a
claim is stated.”); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (affirming that one must
be a party or a privy to be bound by a judgment) (citations omitted); Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (same).
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rendering court’s judgment and its jurisdictional findings, one must
consider whether it is constitutional to preclude a sister state—which
itself was not a party to the initial action—by the rendering court’s
jurisdictional findings. In support of his general argument that states
with strong interests at stake should not be compelled to recognize
adoptions by gays and lesbians, Professor Wardle has posited that
“third persons . . . who were not parties in the case in which the
lesbigay adoption was granted might not be barred from raising
issues that would be binding on the parties themselves.”364
Non-parties to adoption proceedings who claim an interest in the
proceedings (such as grandparents or foster parents) have
occasionally been permitted to collaterally attack adoption decrees,365
but Professor Homer Clark concludes that “[s]trangers to the
adoption probably should not be permitted to attack the decree.”366
In explaining why non-parties are usually bound by adoption decrees,
Clark states, “the relationship of parent and child is basic in society, it
concerns the immediate parties more intimately than anyone else,
and once the parent-child relationship is established by the adoption
decree everyone must be able to rely upon it.”367
Although seemingly inconsistent, Professor Clark’s conclusions can
be reconciled with the general statement that it violates due process
to bind a non-party by a judgment: because those with a pre-existing
relationship with the child have (or claim) a protected liberty interest
of which they might be deprived if they were bound by an adoption
decree, such persons (e.g., grandparents) can be bound only if they
364. Wardle, supra note 16, at 587.
365. 2 CLARK, supra note 276, § 21.13, at 703; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 31(2) (1982) (stating that “[a] judgment in an action whose purpose is
to determine or change a person’s status is conclusive with respect to that status
upon all other persons” subject to stated qualifications, such as when the person has
an interest in the status under applicable law but was denied an opportunity to be a
party to the action).
366. 2 CLARK, supra note 276, § 21.13, at 703.
367. Id. § 21.12, at 691. In the divorce context, the Supreme Court has held that
as long as the spouses were subject to the rendering court’s personal jurisdiction, not
only are they precluded from collaterally attacking the judgment in a sister state, but
so are strangers to the proceedings, such as children and subsequent spouses, as long
as the rendering state would bar such a collateral attack. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 342
U.S. 126, 127–28 (1951) (finding that if the defendant spouse was heard in the state
court or served in that state, both he and strangers to the action would be barred
from attacking the decree collaterally); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 587–89
(1951) (“When a divorce cannot be attacked for lack of jurisdiction by parties
actually before the court or strangers in the rendering state, it cannot be attacked by
them anywhere in the Union.”); see also Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 225 N.E.2d 879 &
228 N.E.2d 400 (N.Y. 1967) (barring a collateral attack on a divorce by the couple’s
child); Virgil v. Virgil, 284 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570–71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (barring a
collateral attack on a divorce by the second husband of one of the parties); SCOLES,
supra note 13, at 637–39.
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were joined and had an opportunity to be heard. Non-parties who
lack a relationship with the child—true strangers to the adoption—
have no protected liberty interest. Therefore, it would not violate
due process to “bind” them by the adoption decree.
While due process thus protects certain non-parties from the
binding effect of an adoption decree, it does not protect states, which
are not “persons” entitled to due process.368 But even if due process
fails to protect states from the binding effect of a sister-state adoption
decree, the state’s interest in the status of its own citizens and the
policies underlying its family law might justify a more robust inquiry
into the rendering court’s jurisdiction. In Williams II, for example, a
man and a woman, both domiciled in North Carolina, wished to
marry one another but first needed to obtain divorces from their
respective spouses.369 So they traveled to Las Vegas and filed for
divorces. Their spouses did not appear in the actions. A Nevada
court granted the divorces, finding the petitioners to be Nevada
domiciliaries. The couple then married in Nevada and returned to
North Carolina, where they lived together as husband and wife.
When the state of North Carolina prosecuted them for bigamy, the
couple claimed that North Carolina was required to give full faith
and credit to their Nevada divorce decrees.370 Having decided in
Williams I that North Carolina was required to recognize a Nevada
divorce decree if either party to the divorce action was a Nevada
domiciliary,371 the Court in Williams II held that North Carolina was
not bound by Nevada’s determination on the issue of domicile:
[S]imply because the Nevada court found that it had power to
award a divorce decree cannot . . . foreclose reexamination by
another State. . . .
....
To permit the necessary finding of domicil by one State to
foreclose all States in the protection of their social institutions
would be intolerable. . . .
....
368. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966) (“The word ‘person’
in the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot, by any
reasonable mode of interpretation, be expanded to encompass the States of the
Union . . . .”).
369. These facts are drawn from the Court’s opinion in Williams I, 317 U.S. 287,
289 (1942).
370. Id. at 289–90. For a discussion of how the Williams decisions “shifted from an
analysis based on the competing interests of different states to an approach that
highlighted the individual interests of the parties involved,” see Estin, supra note 8, at
381.
371. Williams I, 317 U.S. at 301–04.
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We concluded that North Carolina was not required to yield her
State policy because a Nevada court found that petitioners were
domiciled in Nevada when it granted them decrees of divorce.372

Although Williams II lends strong support to the argument that a
state may question the subject matter jurisdiction of another state’s
court in an ex parte proceeding, according to a leading Conflict of
Laws treatise by Professors Scoles, Hay, Borchers and Symeonides,
“[n]o Supreme Court decision has addressed the question whether
the state of the previous domicile may contest the validity of an outof-state inter partes divorce.”373 Given the decisions that bar the
litigants themselves from collaterally attacking divorce decrees for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the treatise authors expect that the
state of domicile, too, would be precluded from reexamining
jurisdictional facts “when the parties had the opportunity to protect
and vindicate their own interests.”374 Put differently, the party that
would be advantaged by the application of the substantive law of the
state of domicile can be counted on to challenge the jurisdiction of
the rendering court and the application of its law. When the parties,
who have the greatest interest in the litigation, have both the
incentive and opportunity to challenge jurisdiction, it would be
wasteful and inconsistent with the policies underlying preclusion
doctrine to permit the state as a “third party” to reexamine the
jurisdictional facts.375
b.

Lack of an adversarial contest

This brings us to the second, related complication. When the
parties do not have incentive to challenge the rendering court’s
jurisdiction—when they acquiesce in the exercise of jurisdiction by a
court outside their state of domicile and in the application of the
rendering state’s law or even collude to create jurisdiction outside
their state of domicile to avoid the application of their home state’s
law—arguably their state of domicile should remain free to
reexamine the jurisdictional facts to assure that the rendering court
372. Williams II, 325 U.S. 226, 232, 234, 239 (1945); see Wardle, supra note 201, at
201–08 (describing the opinions of the Justices in Williams II).
373. SCOLES, supra note 13, at 639.
374. Id. at 640.
375. See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting
the argument that Oklahoma was not required to recognize a Washington state
adoption decree because Oklahoma’s Commissioner of Health had not been a
party). The court concluded that such an “argument would vitiate the Full Faith and
Credit Clause by seemingly requiring each state in the nation to be a party to the
original action in a sister state in order for the resulting judgment to be enforced
across the country. The absurdity of the argument is obvious.” Id. (footnote
omitted).
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in fact had jurisdiction. As Justice Frankfurter argued in dissent in
Sherrer v. Sherrer,376 the home state’s interest in the civil status of its
citizens “cannot be bartered or bargained away by the immediate
parties to the controversy by a default or an arranged contest in a
proceeding for divorce in a State to which the parties are
strangers.”377
This argument, which lies at the intersection between the
unreliability and jurisdictional rationales, is most powerful when
there is a question regarding the rendering court’s territorial subject
matter jurisdiction. In such cases, there is a risk that the home state’s
interest in regulating its citizens through the application of its
substantive law will be thwarted if the parties collude to file in a state
with which they have few or no connections in an effort to get more
permissive law. This risk, which was realized in the nineteenth and
early-to-mid-twentieth centuries when some states had very stringent
divorce statutes while other states had more flexible ones,378 is far less
threatening in the adoption context. Although gay and lesbian
couples living in states that deny them the opportunity to adopt may
well have incentive to “shop” for more progressive law elsewhere,
their ability to do so is restricted both by the jurisdictional provisions
in the laws of other states379 and by the home study and other preplacement screening measures, which ensure that the prospective
adoptive parents in fact have meaningful ties and a support system in
the rendering state.380 Moreover, gay couples wishing to adopt may
prefer to actually move to a more progressive state that permits them

376. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
377. Id. at 358 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); accord Currie, supra note 182, at 9–10
(characterizing Justice Frankfurter’s dissent as “unanswerable” and stating, in the
interstate divorce context, that “[t]o require an interested state to recognize the
judgment of a disinterested one that subverts its legitimate public policy is to
compromise the basic principle that each state has the right to regulate its own
affairs”) (footnote omitted).
378. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 290, at 13 (describing how married persons
would file for divorce in states with more permissive divorce laws).
379. See supra notes 148–151, 202, 250–256 & 295 and accompanying text
(explaining that strong contacts or meaningful connections are jurisdictional
requirements to guarantee sufficient connection to the rendering state).
380. See supra notes 240–246 and accompanying text (describing screening and
evaluation processes for prospective adoptive parents); see also Cox, supra note 13, at
778–79 (explaining that a collateral attack for lack of territorial subject matter
jurisdiction in the adoption context will likely fail because “[t]he adoptive parents
usually live in the state where they seek the adoption . . . and have a child who is also
living in that state”). Although home studies are not usually required in step-parent
and second-parent adoptions, supra note 242, the court nevertheless may order an
evaluation of the prospective second parent. See, e.g., 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 13,
§ 4.12; UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-111, 9 U.L.A. 110 (Part IA 1994).
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to adopt rather than to adopt in a foreign state but have to seek
recognition and live everyday life in a home state with hostile laws.
If a gay couple were to choose to avoid its home state’s restrictive
adoption law by adopting in another state and then returning home
and seeking recognition of the adoption decree, the home state’s
regulatory interest might justify a reexamination of the jurisdictional
facts to ensure that the rendering state had a sufficient connection to
the parties to justify an assertion of territorial subject matter
jurisdiction (and the concomitant application of its own adoption
law).381
But even if concern for the home state’s regulatory interest may
justify reexamination in the enforcing state of the jurisdictional facts
underlying an assertion of territorial subject matter jurisdiction by
the rendering state, it does not justify reexamination of the court’s
true subject matter jurisdiction. After all, if territorial subject matter
jurisdiction is conceded, it follows that the rendering court had a
genuine interest in the parties and a legitimate claim to apply its own
adoption law. While the enforcing court might also be interested in
one or more members of the adoption triad, it would have no unique
interest in assuring that the proper court within the rendering state’s
judicial system had heard the case and certainly no expertise in
making that judgment.382 So the enforcing state’s unique interest in a
local family would not justify an exception to the general rule of
jurisdictional finality in this context.
c.

Exception to the rule of jurisdictional finality

This is where the third complication becomes relevant. Both
Supreme Court precedent and the Second Restatement of Conflicts
have recognized exceptions to the finality of jurisdictional
determinations. In Durfee v. Duke, for example, where the Court held
that “a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit—even as to
questions of jurisdiction,”383 it nevertheless recognized that “the
general rule of finality of jurisdictional determinations is not without
381. See Currie, supra note 182, at 9–10 (discussing uncontested divorce actions).
Even in such cases, there are powerful countervailing concerns. The policy
objectives underlying preclusion doctrine generally—finality, efficiency and
consistency—would be thwarted by relitigation of the jurisdictional facts, and more
importantly, the compelling interest in universal recognition of a final adoption
decree to assure the child the stability and permanence required for healthy
development would be frustrated.
382. Supra notes 329–332 and accompanying text.
383. 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963); see Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78
(1939) (“One trial of an issue is enough. ‘The principles of res judicata apply to
questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues,’ as well to jurisdiction of the
subject matter as of the parties.”) (footnotes omitted).
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exceptions. Doctrines of federal pre-emption or sovereign immunity
may in some contexts be controlling.”384 Although neither of those
exceptions is relevant in the context of interstate recognition of
adoption decrees, the Durfee Court also cited to provisions in the First
Restatement of Judgments and the First Restatement of Conflicts,
which barred collateral challenges for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction “unless the policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata
is outweighed by the policy against permitting the court to act beyond
its jurisdiction.”385
The Second Restatement of Judgments now provides:
When a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the
judgment precludes the parties from litigating the question of the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation except if:
(1) The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the
court’s jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest
abuse of authority; or
(2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the
authority of another tribunal or agency of government; or
(3) The judgment was rendered by a court lacking capability to
make an adequately informed determination of a question
concerning its own jurisdiction and as a matter of procedural
fairness the party seeking to avoid the judgment should have
opportunity belatedly to attack the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction.386

Durfee and the Restatement provisions reinforce legislative primacy
in the allocation of authority among a state’s courts by permitting
collateral challenges when the judicial authority exercised grossly
exceeds the legislative allocation.
As long as courts in the both the rendering and enforcing states
properly understand the narrow meaning of true subject matter
jurisdiction,387 there should be few occasions for collateral attacks
based on a lack of true subject matter jurisdiction. It will be the rare
case where the petitioners file their adoption petition in a state court
that lacks authority to consider it.388 Even if petitioners were to file in
the wrong court, it is highly likely that the court would dismiss for
384. Durfee, 375 U.S. at 114 (citing Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940) and
United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940)).
385. Id. at 114 n.12 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 451(2)
(Supp. 1948); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 10(1) (1942)).
386. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982).
387. See supra notes 297–304, 309–316 and accompanying text.
388. Whitten, supra note 13, at 820 (stating that “the circumstances in which a
party will pick a court without subject-matter jurisdiction to grant an adoption under
local law will be rare, if not non-existent”).
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lack of jurisdiction (with leave to refile in the proper court). There
is, of course, a risk that the rendering court will make an error of
substantive law that the enforcing court will deem “jurisdictional”—
either because the enforcing court misunderstands the narrow
parameters of true subject matter jurisdiction or because the
rendering state actually treats the underlying substantive requirement
as jurisdictional in nature. But even in such cases, a collateral attack
would be permitted under section 12 only if “entertaining the action
was a manifest abuse of authority,” a very high standard that leaves
the enforcing court no room to deny recognition to the judgment on
public policy grounds.389
In sum, then, while the enforcing court may decline to recognize
an adoption decree if the rendering court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, the availability of this rationale is greatly limited by the
narrow definition of true subject matter jurisdiction; by preclusion
doctrine, which bars the parties themselves from relitigating
jurisdictional issues that they actually litigated or might have litigated
in the rendering court; and by the great likelihood that the rendering
court will have subject matter jurisdiction because petitioners will file
their adoption petition before the proper court in a state with which
they have some meaningful connection. The only circumstances in
which the jurisdictional rationale might justify non-recognition of a
sister-state adoption decree would be (1) where the petitioners filed
in a state with which neither they nor the child had any meaningful
connection and the proceeding was non-adversarial; or
(2) where adoption was so “plainly” beyond the rendering court’s
true subject matter jurisdiction “that its entertaining the action was a
manifest abuse of authority.”390
D. The “Enforcement and Incidents of Adoption” Rationale
Both Professor Wardle and the State of Oklahoma have advanced
the “enforcement and incidents of adoption” rationale for declining
to recognize sister-state adoptions by same-sex couples.391 The
rationale has two prongs. First, the enforcement prong posits that
states need not “adopt the practices of other States regarding the
time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments.
389. Accord id. at 818–24.
390. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12(1).
391. See Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1304 (W.D. Okla. 2006),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007)
(discussing Oklahoma’s position); Wardle, supra note 16, at 597–99 (arguing that
states are not obligated to recognize incidents of adoption that violate their strong
public policy).
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Enforcement measures do not travel with the sister-state
judgment . . .; such measures remain subject to the evenhanded
control of forum law.”392 Second, the incidents prong posits that even
if a state is compelled to recognize an adoption finalized in a sister
state, it remains free to apply its own law regarding the incidents of
adoption as long as it has a significant relationship with the family,393
or, at a minimum, to decline to recognize those incidents of adoption
that would seriously undermine its strong public policy.394 While
both prongs have some basis in law and policy, neither justifies a
state’s refusal to recognize an adoption by a same-sex couple finalized
in another state or to deny gay and lesbian adoptive parents and their
families the same rights, responsibilities and other incidents of
adoption as are accorded to other adoptive families under its law. We
will address the two prongs in turn.
1.

The enforcement prong
It is well accepted that F2 may apply its own enforcement measures,
rather than those of the rendering state.395 For example, the
enforcing court may apply its own statute of limitations to determine
the period of time in which an action to enforce a judgment (even a
sister-state judgment) must be brought;396 its own garnishment
procedures;397 its own law to determine whether one spouse’s interest
in community property may be used to satisfy a judgment rendered
against her alone in a sister state;398 and its own law to establish the
Likewise, if,
priority among competing judgment creditors.399
because of a state constitutional prohibition against imprisonment
392. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998) (citing McElmoyle ex
rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 325 (1839), and the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 99 (1971)).
393. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 238(1), 262(1) & 290
(1971); 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 188 (2004).
394. Wardle, supra note 16, at 597–99; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 290 cmt. c (1971) (“A state will not give a particular incident to a foreign
adoption when to do so would be contrary to its strong public policy.”).
395. See, e.g., Baker, 522 U.S. at 235; Dunn v. City of Elgin, Illinois, 347 F.3d 641,
647 (7th Cir. 2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 99 (1971)
(“The local law of the forum determines the methods by which a judgment of
another state is enforced.”).
396. See, e.g., McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey, 38 U.S. at 328 (1839); Pan Energy v.
Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1144, 1146 (Utah 1991); Marine Midland Bank v. Bicknell,
848 A.2d 1134, 1137 (Vt. 2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 118(2) (1971).
397. See, e.g., Am. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Speros, 494 N.W.2d 599,
603-04 (N.D. 1993).
398. See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Moore, 122 P.3d 1265, 1267–69 (N.M. Ct. App.
2005); Am. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 494 N.W.2d at 603–05.
399. See, e.g., Am. Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. Paste-Ups Unlimited, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 219,
225 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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for debt, the enforcing state does not order specific performance of
separation agreements requiring the payment of money and does not
hold debtors in civil contempt, then these remedies need not be
made available to enforce a sister-state judgment even if a court in a
sister state already has ordered specific performance.400
Even though it is well established that states are free to apply their
own enforcement measures to sister-state judgments, the
enforcement prong for nonrecognition is unavailing for two reasons.
First, it is unclear whether or how the enforcement measures of the
several states differ from one another in any meaningful way in the
adoption context. In the context of civil judgments generally,
enforcement problems typically arise in connection with money
judgments, when the judgment debtor fails to pay and the judgment
creditor seeks to invoke the state’s assistance.401 Laws vary in terms of
“what types of collection actions may be used, how a judgment must
be registered or otherwise established in the forum state, and what
court or other proceedings must be used to enforce the judgment,”402
and under the enforcement prong, the forum is free to apply its own
law regarding these issues. Such problems do not typically arise in
connection with adoption decrees, and neither Professor Wardle nor
the state of Oklahoma identified any meaningful difference among
state laws regarding enforcement of adoption decrees (although the
incidents of adoption may vary state-to-state).403
Second, even if there were a difference among state enforcement
mechanisms, states may not tinker with them in an effort to avoid
their obligation to recognize or enforce sister-state judgments. For
example, several decades ago, a federal employee who lived in New
Jersey and worked in Philadelphia sought to avoid payment of a
Philadelphia wage tax.404 The City of Philadelphia sued him in a
Pennsylvania court to collect the tax and won. Philadelphia then
sued the employee on the Pennsylvania judgment in New Jersey in
the hope of levying against the employee’s New Jersey property. In
400. See Sainz v. Sainz, 245 S.E.2d 372, 374–75 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978).
401. See, e.g., JAMES ET AL., supra note 184, § 2.8, at 87 (noting that enforcement in
another state may be necessary if the defendant fails to satisfy the judgment).
402. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
403. Professor Wardle focused on the incidents prong, rather than the
enforcement prong, of this rationale. See Wardle, supra note 16, at 597–99. While
the state of Oklahoma specifically invoked the enforcement prong of the rationale,
Finstuen, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1304, its argument went to the issuance of a revised birth
certificate, which is an incident of adoption. See infra Part IV.D.2 (discussing mild
and strong versions of incidents of adoption prong).
404. City of Phila. v. Bauer, 478 A.2d 773, 774 (N.J. 1984) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:17–17).
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the meantime, New Jersey enacted a law providing that “‘[n]o
judgment obtained for the payment of any employment wage tax
shall be enforced’ by levying on the taxpayer’s real property.”405 At
the time, there were no New Jersey municipalities that imposed a
wage tax and the Governor’s signing statement made clear that the
purpose of the law was to block Philadelphia from collecting unpaid
wage taxes by attaching or disposing of the property of New Jersey
residents.406
In holding that the statute violated the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated:
Although . . . local law may determine the scope and nature of
available remedies[,] . . . it is clear that a state may not, by unduly
burdening the means to enforce a foreign judgment, refuse to give
full faith and credit to that judgment. . . . [T]he enforcing state
“may not, under the guise of merely affecting the remedy, deny the
enforcement of claims otherwise within the protection of the full
faith and credit clause . . . .”407

Thus, if gay adoptive parents needed the machinery of states
beyond the rendering state to enforce their adoption decrees, the
Full Faith and Credit Clause would bar such states from withholding
their enforcement machinery because of a disagreement with the
substantive law underlying the decrees.408 As the Tenth Circuit
explained in the Finstuen litigation:
If Oklahoma had no statute providing for the issuance of
supplementary birth certificates for adopted children, the
[plaintiffs] could not invoke the Full Faith and Credit Clause in
asking Oklahoma for a new birth certificate. However, Oklahoma
has such a statute—i.e., it already has the necessary “mechanism[]
for enforcing [adoption] judgments.” The [plaintiffs] merely ask

405. Id. at 774.
406. Id. at 775, 777.
407. Id. at 778 (quoting Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935)) (other
citations omitted).
408. See Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 292 (1939) (“A state which may not
constitutionally refuse to open its courts to a suit on a judgment of another state
because of the nature of the cause of action merged in the judgment, obviously
cannot, by the adoption of a particular rule of liability or of procedure, exclude from
its courts a suit on the judgment.”) (citation omitted); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S.
629, 643 (1935) (stating that a state “may not, under the guise of merely affecting the
remedy, deny the enforcement of claims otherwise within the protection of the
[F]ull [F]aith and [C]redit [C]lause”) (citation omitted); Hieston v. Nat’l City Bank,
280 F. 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1922) (holding that a sister-state judgment must be
recognized even if the underlying law violates the public policy of the enforcing
state).

2008]

ARE YOU STILL MY MOTHER?

75

Oklahoma to apply its own law to “enforce” their adoption order in
an “even-handed” manner.409

Thus, the enforcement prong of the “enforcement and incidents of
adoption” rationale provides no justification for non-recognition of
sister-state adoption decrees.
2.

The incidents of adoption prong
a.

The mild version

There are two distinct versions of the incidents prong of the
“enforcement and incidents of adoption” rationale. The mild version
is explicitly set out in the Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws.
Comment b to section 290 provides that “[a] state will usually give the
same incidents to a foreign adoption that it gives to an adoption
granted by its own courts.”410 In other words, while F2 is required
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize F1 adoptions, F2
is free to apply its own law regarding the incidents of adoption, such
as an adoptee’s right to her adoptive parent’s name and support, her
right to an intestate share in her parent’s estate, or her right to
recover damages for the wrongful death of an adoptive parent.411 For
example, if the biological parent of a child adopted in F1 were later
to die intestate while domiciled in F2, F1’s law would determine the
validity of the adoption but an F2 court would be free to apply F2’s
intestate succession law to determine if the adoptee could inherit
from the biological parent.412 If F2’s law permitted a child to inherit
through intestacy from a biological parent even after adoption,413 an
F2 court would permit the adoptee to inherit from the biological
parent domiciled in F2 even if F1’s law barred adoptees from
inheriting through intestacy from their biological parents.414 But the
F2 court could not grant this inheritance right to most adoptees while
denying it to children adopted in other states by gay parents; it must
409. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1154 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Baker v.
General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998)).
410. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 290 cmt. b (1971); accord
Taintor, supra note 148, at 256; Whitten, supra note 13, at 807.
411. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 290 cmt. a (1971); see also
CLARK, supra note 276, § 21.12, at 683–91 (describing many of the incidents of
adoption).
412. See, e.g., Pyles v. Russell, 36 S.W.3d 365, 366–68 (Ky. 2000); N.W. Nat’l Cas.
Co. v. Doucette, 817 S.W.2d 396, 398–99 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
413. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-103 (2005).
414. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-105(a)(2) (2007) (stating that an adopted
child’s right to inherit through intestacy from a biological parent terminates when
the adoption decree becomes final); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 238(1) & 262(1) (1971) (forum courts use their local law to determine an
adopted child’s intestacy rights); 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 188 (2004) (same).
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apply its law regarding the incidents of adoption in an even-handed
manner.415
Thus, while the mild version of the incidents prong is wellestablished, it does not permit a state with a restrictive adoption law
to discriminate against gay adoptive parents and their families by
denying them the incidents of adoption afforded to other adoptive
families.
b.

The strong version

Professor Wardle has articulated the strong version of the incidents
of adoption prong: “a state may decline to recognize or enforce
incidents of adoptions from sister states that violate strong public
policy of the state.”416 Thus, under the strong version of the incidents
prong, not only may F2 apply its own law regarding the incidents of
adoption, but it may decline to accord a particular incident to a sisterstate adoption based on public policy grounds. Thus, the strong
version of the incidents of adoption prong intersects the public policy
rationale.
Professor Wardle invokes both the Second Restatement of Conflicts
and case law to support the strong version.417 At first glance,
comment c to section 290 of the Second Restatement appears to
provide such support: “A state will not give a particular incident to a
foreign adoption when to do so would be contrary to its strong public
policy.”418 But the Restatement provision is clearly limited to
adoptions finalized outside the United States. The sentence in
comment c that immediately follows makes this point explicit:
415. See City of Phila. v. Bauer, 478 A.2d 773, 777 (N.J. 1984) (“‘The legislature
cannot accomplish indirectly that which it could not do directly.’ A state may not by
subterfuge refuse to give full faith and credit to the judgment of a sister state.”)
(citation omitted).
It may well be that such discrimination would violate the Equal Protection Clause.
See Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1307–12 (W.D. Okla. 2006) aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the Oklahoma statute violated the Equal Protection Clause); see also
Spector, supra note 13, at 468 n.4 (considering an equal protection challenge to the
Oklahoma statute). The equal protection analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.
416. Wardle, supra note 16, at 598; see Taintor, supra note 148, at 254 (stating that
“[i]t may be that the public policy of one state demands that one of the incidents of
an adoption be denied within the state” and positing that an unmarried 25-year-old
father who adopted a 20-year-old daughter “might well” be denied the right of
custody but the daughter might retain the right to inherit by intestate succession).
But see 2 CLARK, supra note 276, § 21.12, at 692 (stating that it is “erroneous” to deny
adoption decrees recognition on public policy grounds; concluding that “[t]hese
decrees should be recognized pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause regardless
of differences in the law of adoption”) (footnote omitted).
417. Wardle, supra note 16, at 599–608.
418. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 290 cmt. c (1971).
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So a state might not permit a child adopted in a foreign nation to
inherit from his adoptive parent if it found that the only purpose of
the parties in arranging for the adoption was to permit the child to
emigrate to that state, or to permit inheritance by an adult adopted
in a foreign proceeding from his one and only adoptive parent.419

Moreover, the Reporter’s Note that accompanies comment c cites
only three cases, all of which involve Greek adoptions.420 Because
foreign judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit under the
Constitution, this section of the Second Restatement lends no
support to the strong version of the incidents prong as applied to
sister-state adoptions.
Professor Wardle also relies on case law that purportedly denies, on
public policy grounds, adult adoptees (adopted in other states or
countries) the right to inherit from or through an adoptive parent.421
It is uncontroverted that:
[T]he inheritance rights of the adopted child . . . should be
determined by the law governing succession; that is to say, by the
law of the situs in the case of immovables [i.e., real estate] and in
the case of movables by the law of the state where the adoptive
parent was domiciled at the time of his death.422

But the cases cited by Professor Wardle go much further, denying
adult adoptees the right to inherit even though inheritance is an
incident of adoption under F2 law and even though the adult
adoptions were valid in the rendering states.423
419. Id. (emphasis added).
420. Id. Reporter’s Note (citing Tsilidis v. Pedakis, 132 So. 2d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1961); In re Gillies’ Estate, 83 A.2d 889 (N.J. 1959); Doulgeris v. Bambacaus, 127
S.E.2d 145 (Va. 1962)).
421. Wardle, supra note 16, at 599–609 (citations omitted).
422. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 290 cmt. b (1971)
(citations omitted); see also id. §§ 238(1), 262(1).
423. See Abramovic v. Brunken, 94 Cal. Rptr. 303, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)
(determining that will executed by testator who died eleven years prior to enactment
of adult adoption law could not have intended will to include adult adoptees);
Williams v. Ward, 93 Cal. Rptr. 107, 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (finding that testator
who died prior to the enactment of the adult adoption law and who knew that his
daughter would not bear children did not intent to include adult adoptee); In re
Trust Created by Belgard, 829 P.2d 457, 459 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that
without clear intent by testator to include adult adoptee, such an adoptee did not fall
within definition of “child”); Tsilidis v. Pedakis, 132 So. 2d 9, 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1961) (finding foreign adoption of adult invalid under Florida law); Cross v. Cross,
532 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (refusing to give adult adoptee inheritance
rights); In re Nowels Estate, 339 N.W.2d 861 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (same); In re Trust
for the Benefit of Duke, 702 A.2d 1008, 1021 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1995) (same); In
re Estate of Nicol, 377 A.2d 1201, 1208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (same); In re
Estate of Griswold, 354 A.2d 717, 720 (Morris County (N.J.) Ct. 1976) (same); In re
Comly’s Estate, 218 A.2d 175, 178 (Gloucester (N.J.) County Ct. 1966) (same); cf.
Corbett v. Stergios, 137 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Iowa 1965) (recognizing foreign adult
adoption for inheritance purposes); In re Estate of Tafel, 296 A.2d 797, 800, 803 (Pa.
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Although these cases appear to support the strong version of the
incidents prong, in fact virtually all are inapposite. Two of the cited
cases involve adoptions finalized in foreign countries, which are not
entitled to full faith and credit.424 While these cases contain language
that appears to support the strong version of the incidents prong—
“the parties cannot . . . invest a foreign decree with such dignity as to
preclude the local forum from applying its laws in determining
whether the incidents of the foreign decree are repugnant to or
against the policy of the local forum”425—these cases do not govern
sister-state adoptions, which are entitled to full faith and credit under
the federal Constitution.426
Most of the cited cases consider whether an adult adopted by the
testator’s or settlor’s heir after the testator’s or settlor’s death should
be considered members of a class of “children” or “issue” or
“descendants” within the meaning of the testator’s will or trust
instrument. These cases seek to “ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the testator or settlor,”427 and therefore are not really
interstate recognition cases at all. As one court put it, “[w]hatever
the rights of inheritance of [the adoptees] may be by reason of their
adoption, their status under the will . . . is to be decided by the
answer to the question whether [they] are included among the
persons the testator intended to share in his estate.”428 Put another
way, even in a purely domestic case involving an adult adoption
finalized in the forum state, a court would have to determine whether
the testator intended to include adult adoptees as members of a class
of “children” in her will.
Some states have developed default rules or presumptions to apply
in the absence of express indications of intent. For example, in the
absence of evidence of an intent to the contrary, some states permit
adult adoptees to inherit as members of a class of “children” only if
they lived as members of the adoptive parent’s household while
minors429 or if they were adopted before the testator executed the
1972) (adopting presumption that testators intend to include adoptees for
inheritance purposes).
424. See Tsilidis, 132 So. 2d at 13 (concluding that an adult adoption finalized in
Greece violated Florida public policy). Professor Wardle also cites Corbett, 137
N.W.2d at 269, a case in which the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that an adoption
of a minor finalized in Greece did not violate Iowa public policy.
425. Tsilidis, 132 So. 2d at 13.
426. Professor Wardle concedes this point. Wardle, supra note 16, at 605–06.
427. In re Nowels Estate, 339 N.W.2d at 863.
428. Williams, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 109 (citation omitted).
429. 3 HOLLINGER, supra note 13, § 12.04[3][b][v], at 12–58 n.82 and
accompanying text (discussing CAL. PROB. CODE § 21115(b) (West 2007)); see In re
Estate of Pittman, 163 Cal. Rptr. 527, 529 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that, while
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will.430 Since the question in these trusts and estate cases is the
settlor’s or testator’s intent rather than the obligation of one state to
recognize judgments entered by courts in sister states, these cases do
not support the strong version of the incidents prong.
Given the irrelevance of the foreign adoption cases and the trusts
and estates cases, only one of the adult adoption cases cited by
Professor Wardle remains. On its face, First National Bank of St.
Petersburg v. Mott431 lends support to the strong version of the
incidents prong. There, Samuel Doane and his wife adopted Mae
Mott, a thirty-three-year-old woman, in Connecticut. During her
childhood and youth, Mae had lived in their home and been treated
as a daughter.432 When Samuel Doane died intestate in Florida, the
probate court was asked to determine whether Mae had the same
right to inherit Samuel’s Florida real estate as a biological child.
After initially concluding in Mott I that the county probate court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine the validity and effect
of the Connecticut adoption,433 the Florida Supreme Court in Mott II
relied upon two Florida statutes to support its conclusion that Mae
could not inherit Samuel’s real property under Florida’s intestate
succession law. One statute provided that a child adopted in another
state could inherit as if the adoption had been finalized in Florida if
she “shall afterward become a citizen of this State.”434 Another statute
provided that any child adopted under Florida’s adoption statute
“shall be declared the child and heir-at-law” of the adoptive parent.435
Even if Mae had become a citizen of Florida, bringing her within the
scope of the first statute, the Florida Supreme Court held that “the
[second] statute does not contemplate the adoption of an adult
married woman by persons so that she ‘shall be considered the heir’
adult adoptees normally cannot receive gifts given to “children,” there is an
exception for those adoptees who lived with their adoptive parents as minors).
430. 3 HOLLINGER, supra note 13, § 12.04[3][b][v], at 12–59 n.86 and
accompanying text (citing Minary v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co., 419 S.W.2d 340,
344 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967)); see In re Estate of Tafel, 296 A.2d 797, 802–03 (Pa. 1972)
(noting that in the absence of intent to omit children adopted after the execution of
a will, a testator is presumed to treat adopted children the same as biological
children).
431. 133 So. 78 (Fla. 1931) (Mott II); see Mott v. First Nat’l Bank of St. Petersburg,
124 So. 36, 37 (Fla. 1929) (Mott I) (prior proceeding involving the same adoption).
Professor Wardle cites another case that concluded that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause required California to recognize an adult adoption finalized in Rhode Island
even though adult adoption conflicted with California policy at the time. In re
Morris’ Estate, 133 P.2d 452, 456 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943).
432. Mott I, 124 So. at 37 (citation omitted).
433. Id. at 38.
434. Mott II, 133 So. at 79 (quoting FLA. REV. GEN’L STAT. § 3624 (1920)
(repealed)).
435. Id. (quoting FLA. REV. GEN’L STAT. § 3268 (1920) (repealed)).
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of such persons, ‘and entitled to inherit according to the laws of
Florida.’”436 Although the court in Mott II did not discuss the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, the court in Mott I stated that the parentchild relationship created by the Connecticut adoption decree
will be recognized in Florida under the rules of comity or under
the [F]ull [F]aith and [C]redit [C]lause of the Federal
Constitution, unless such status or the rights flowing therefrom are
not contemplated by or are repugnant to the laws or policy of the
state of Florida upon the subject.437

Thus, it is fair to maintain that the Mott decisions support the
strong version of the incidents prong.
But it would be a mistake to put too much weight on Mott. First,
Mott and the strong version are inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s far more recent statement in Baker that “[r]egarding
judgments, . . . the full faith and credit obligation is exacting. . . .
[O]ur decisions support no roving ‘public policy exception’ to the
full faith and credit due judgments.”438 Baker is relevant here because
the strong version of the incidents prong is nothing more than the
public policy rationale in disguise. It is one thing to maintain, as the
weak version does, that the forum state is free to apply its own law
regarding the incidents of adoption to all adoptive families before it,
regardless of the state of adoption. The weak version accords full
faith and credit to sister-state adoption decrees but reserves to the
forum state the freedom to decide the legal consequences that flow
from such status determinations. It is quite another thing to posit
that the forum state may accord benefits to local adoptive families (or
adoptive families with straight parents) while denying adoptive
families created in sister states (or adoptive families with gay parents)
those same incidents of adoption. After all, it is not the incident of
adoption that the forum state finds objectionable—there is nothing
objectionable about a child inheriting from her parent or a child’s
birth certificate reflecting her adoptive parents’ names. What the
forum state finds objectionable is the underlying adoption itself (in
Mott, the adoption of an adult; here, the adoption by a gay couple).
But the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not permit states to deny
recognition to sister-state adoption decrees on public policy
grounds.439

436.
437.
438.
439.

Id. (quoting § 3624).
Mott I, 124 So. at 37.
Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (citations omitted).
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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Second, Mott may be better understood as a real property case than
as a public policy (or strong version) case. At bottom, Mott
considered a Connecticut adoptee’s right to inherit real estate under
Florida law. Its holding, that Florida could determine which
adoptees qualified as heirs to Florida real property, is consistent with
an early body of Supreme Court case law recognizing the right of
states to determine the devolution of real estate within their borders
regardless of sister-state judgments purporting to affect it.440 In Hood
v. McGehee,441 for example, George McGehee adopted children in
Louisiana.442 McGehee thereafter acquired real estate in Alabama.
Upon McGehee’s death, the adoptees claimed an interest in his
Alabama property. Finding that a letter probated as a will in
Mississippi, which left all his property to the adopted children in
equal shares, “could [not] take effect on real estate in Alabama,”443
the Court considered whether the adoptees could inherit under
Alabama’s intestate succession law.444 The Alabama Supreme Court
had previously construed the statute to exclude children adopted in
other states. The United States Supreme Court held that “the law, so
construed, is valid. . . . There is no failure to give full credit to the
adoption of the plaintiffs, in a provision denying them the right to
inherit land in another state. Alabama is sole mistress of the
devolution of Alabama land by descent.”445 Even though Alabama
had no public policy objection to the Louisiana adoptions, the Court
upheld Alabama’s right to disregard them when quieting title to
Alabama real estate.
A leading Conflicts treatise criticizes Hood, stating that “the forum
should not treat a foreign adopted child differently from one
adopted locally when the incidents of the relationship are
substantially the same in both states”446 and suggesting “the
probability that Hood would not be followed today.”447 Hood appears
inconsistent with both the Court’s later decisions under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause448 as well as basic anti-discrimination principles

440. See supra note 176 (summarizing early Supreme Court case law).
441. 237 U.S. 611 (1915).
442. Id. at 614.
443. Id. at 614–15.
444. Id. at 615.
445. Id. at 615 (citations omitted).
446. SCOLES, supra note 13, § 16.6, at 703 n.2 (citation omitted).
447. Id. (citations omitted).
448. See, e.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (rejecting a
public policy exception for judgments); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611–14
(1951) (holding that, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Wisconsin could not
decline to entertain an action under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, where its own
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underlying the Privileges and Immunities449 and Equal Protection
Clauses.450 In light of Hood, Mott should be restricted to its facts
rather than read as supporting the strong version of the incidents
prong. In all events, Mott and Hood are rather thin reeds on which to
rest the strong version of the incidents prong.
In sum, while states are free to apply their own mechanisms to
enforce sister-state judgments and their own laws regarding the
incidents of adoption, they must do so evenhandedly. Moreover, just
as states must recognize sister-state adoptions regardless of public
policy objections, they must afford sister-state adoptions the same
incidents they afford to local adoptions. The strong version of the
incidents of adoption prong suffers the same fate as the public policy
rationale.
CONCLUSION
The Full Faith and Credit Clause commands that judgments
rendered in one state be recognized in sister states. This command
extends to adoption decrees regardless of the sexual orientation of
the adoptive parents. None of the rationales offered to justify nonrecognition is persuasive. The Supreme Court has consistently
interpreted the Clause to require interstate recognition of judgments
even where the enforcing court finds the law embodied in the
judgment inimical to its public policy. The Court’s rejection of a
public policy exception serves the best interests of the states and the
Union and, in the adoption context, serves the child’s overriding
interest in stable family relationships. While adoption proceedings
often are non-adversarial, adoption decrees reflect an exercise of
judgment by a judge informed by impartial experts and interested
third parties. The transformational effect of an adoption decree is
not altered by the consensual nature of the proceedings. While a
state may decline to recognize an adoption decree rendered without
subject matter jurisdiction, this rationale justifies nonrecognition in
very few cases both because few rendering courts will actually lack
jurisdiction and because preclusion doctrine often will bar
relitigation of jurisdictional issues in the enforcing court. Finally,
while states remain free to apply their own laws regarding the
statute permitted recovery for wrongful death and all of the parties were Wisconsin
citizens).
449. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
450. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); see supra note 415 and accompanying
text (discussing possible equal protection violations).
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incidents of adoption, they must do so in an evenhanded manner
and may not withhold the incidents of adoption on public policy
grounds.

